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This thesis is dedicated to my fellow Zimbabwean youth. As we struggle for a better future, I 
hope that this study helps us analyse the complexities of holding our politicians accountable and 
of achieving social cohesion. Furthermore, I hope it grants us a deeper understanding of the 
systemic Goliath we are facing and assists us in improving our strategies of research, policy 
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The thesis contextualises the state of transitional justice, elite outlooks and militarisation in 
Zimbabwe, whilst drawing attention to the complexities of achieving this reality. The study draws 
from transitional justice, civil-military relations, as well as the political settlements literature as 
analytical frameworks.  
 
Essentially, the study poses two key questions: How does studying transitional justice and elite 
culture help pre-plan for strategies to professionalise the military and reallocate civic-political 
duties to citizens should Zimbabwe transition out of authoritarianism? Once achieved, how can 
this be sustained towards socio-economic development?  
 
The study also tackles questions of justice and impunity whilst framing client-patron relations 
amongst the elite as impediments to progress. Amidst cyclical episodes of violation, the thesis 
links the denial of justice through amnesties, corruption, and further violence, to the politics of 
policing memory and trauma. This is analysed within the scope of the late Robert Mugabe regime 
as well as the current Emmerson Mnangagwa regime – both of which are inherited legacies from 
the Ian Smith regime. The intricacies of elite networks and accumulation are then laid out, 
culminating in deliberations on how to navigate prospects for reform, in understanding the politics 
of non-recurrence when contextualising systemic as well as physical violence. The thesis aims to 
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… even in a post-Mugabe era there will be “tremendous problems to overcome”, needing a 
“hard headed notion of progress, rooted in painful and complex realities”  























Contextualising the argument 
 
Militarisation has been inherent in elitist legitimacies in Zimbabwe. The configuration of 
bargaining elites was, however, always intended to create a hegemony of the Zimbabwe African 
National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF). The Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) had 
served as a threat to the existence of both ZANU-PF and the benefits that came to those aligned to 
it since Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) had split from ZAPU on 8 August 1963 
(Sithole, 1988:254). Former President Robert Mugabe knew that “tolerating a partner in 
government will be costly because each [alliance] will almost certainly pursue very different if not 
competing policies” (Walter, 1999:137-8). The foundations of which were laid through tokenised 
political settlements seen from the 1978 Internal Settlement until the 1979 Lancaster House 
Agreement which facilitated Zimbabwe’s independence. Mugabe’s continued intolerance of 
opposition is seen in the cyclical legacy of violence where ZANU-PF deemed Patriotic Front-
Zimbabwe African People’s Union (PF-ZAPU) and all other opposition “enemies of the state” and 
worked to systemically dislodge their power (Bratton, 2016:55). Under Mugabe, ZANU-PF came 
to gain control by dominating political and economic institutions in Zimbabwe (Makumbe, 2003, 
in Bratton, 2016:61; Zimbabwe Institute, 2008). This method of survival continues to be used, in 
2019, by the ruling party under President Emmerson Mnangagwa (Alexander & McGregor, 
2013:758).  
 
Zimbabwean political culture, as inherited from Rhodesia, performs politics within the suppression 
of truths that criticises those in power and their allies (Bratton, 2016; Kriger, 2012). Though this 
and its implications will be further discussed in Chapters III (1) and IV (3) of the thesis, it is 
important to understand that this is the environment in which Transitional Justice (TJ) operates in 
Zimbabwe. From negotiations towards the independence settlement in 1980, Zimbabwe made “no 
concerted formalised attempt to allow truth telling [nor] to promote reconciliation between the 
three warring parties – ZANU-PF, PF-ZAPU and the Rhodesians” (Eppel, 2006:262). Likewise, 
prioritising narratives that recognised, and continue to acknowledge, some instances of violence 
over others is politically shrewd yet distinctively problematic (Eppel, 2013:212-3). Bratton 
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(2016:52), with the benefit of hindsight, notes that “the independence settlement deferred 
[fundamental problems] that would later come back to haunt the country”. One can witness the 
manifestation of his sentiments through the nature of ZANU-PF clientelism and the militarised 
conditions for its survival and accumulation (Alexander, 2013; Moore, 2012; Kriger, 2012).  
 
Considering past, and recent episodes, of organised violence, torture, and abduction of 
Zimbabwean citizens, national conversations around perpetration, healing, and justice need to 
occur. In this, TJ efforts, which work to foster an environment for non-recurrence of violation, are 
pivotal. However, until past and future TJ efforts in Zimbabwe recognise the nature of political 
settlements in the country, attempts at institutional reform will likely prove futile (Bratton, 
2016:228). That said, redressing human rights abuses requires nuanced engagements with 
intersecting approaches to people and communities (Mani, 2005). Efforts at national healing must 
then be understood within the need to navigate Zimbabwe’s power politics in this thesis. Analyses 
in this thesis are focused on institutional post-2008 efforts due to the timeframe in which 
institutional reform was prioritised as a thematic area within the country’s TJ conversation. This 
does not take away from cumulative efforts of various stakeholders dating further than the ‘Civil 
Society and Justice Symposium in Zimbabwe’ in August 2003, notable for its formative 
conversation regarding the National Transitional Justice Working Group of Zimbabwe (NTJWG) 
(Eppel, 2006; Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, 2014:1-3).  
 
The thesis investigates the state of TJ and militarisation in Zimbabwe whilst revisiting 
conversations that promote calls for guarantees of non-recurrence, the re-professionalisation of the 
military and conducive environment outside the patronage-based economy for inclusive 
institutions. The thesis elaborates on the linkages pertaining to the politics of delivering the 
guarantees of non-recurrence whilst militarised elites remain in power. Furthermore, it highlights 
possible in-roads and challenges to transforming institutions within patronage economies. In doing 
this, connections to institutions, political leadership and the military are underscored throughout 
the thesis through political settlements analyses and reference to ‘securocrats’ (Alexander, 2013; 
Chitiyo & Rupiya, 2005; Eppel, 2013; ICG, 2010). Here, securocrats are defined as nationally 
high-ranking military service chiefs who navigate state politics as the elite in governance, public 
resource generation, business and electoral spaces for personal benefits that necessitate their 
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survival (Alexander & McGregor, 2013:758; ICG, 2010:11-3; Tendi, 2013:837). The thesis 
analyses post-liberation settlements from the Unity Accord of 1987 as first political settlement in 
independent Zimbabwe. Though the 1979 Lancaster House Agreement which brought about 
Zimbabwe’s independence from the 1978 Internal Settlement that had resulted in the hybrid state 
of ‘Zimbabwe-Rhodesia’ are noted; they remain pertinent to the legacy rather than the content 
scope of this thesis (Bratton, 2016:46-7). 
 
Following what Eppel (2009b:1) refers to as “the worst state violence since the Gukurahundi 
massacres of the 1980s”, the Global Political Agreement (GPA) between the ruling ZANU-PF, 
with Robert Mugabe as President, and the two opposition Movement for Democratic Change 
(MDC) factions, with Morgan Tsvangirai as Prime Minister and Arthur Mutambara and Thokozani 
Khupe as Deputy Prime Ministers, was formed (Mutisi, 2011). This settlement mandated the 
Government of National Unity (GNU) which ran from 2009-2013. The electoral violence and 
“torture of 2008 [had] denied Tsvangirai electoral victory, and simultaneously denied Mugabe 
legitimacy” (Eppel, 2013:211). Moore (2012:1-2) notes this form of election outcome – in “the 
thinnest [display] of democracy” – as a still-born transitional inclusive government. Yet, it can be 
argued that the most significant national effort towards transitional justice in contemporary 
Zimbabwean history came out of this political settlement. A key result of the MDC joining 
government was the inclusion of justice and reconciliation initiatives on the executive political 
agenda (Thomson & Jazdowska, 2012:81). However, as will be shown, the political culture in 
Zimbabwe then, as it is in 2019, does not allow for effective engagement with such initiatives 
(Eppel, 2009b:2–3).  
 
The thesis updates the status of historical impediments to accessing retributive and distributive 
justice in Zimbabwe in the Mnangagwa regime as at 2019. The study does so by outlining links 
through political leadership and the military; networks of accumulation; cycles of violence; trauma 
and denialism; as well as calls and responses to justice by citizens and the government. All which 
feed into each other to maintain the status quo. Historically, the technical approach within TJ has 
prioritised civil-political rights where efforts to confronting the effects of physical violence 
supersede those of structural violence and a lack of social cohesion (Gready & Robins, 2014:342; 
Nesiah, 2016:5,27). As Nesiah (2016:27) notes, identifying the ‘structural’ helps in rethinking 
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justice delivery “as a pre-packaged menu”. Long term impact requires a more nuanced relationship 
that identifies ‘holistic’ interventions premised on “the interrelationship between many domains 
of justice struggles” that make TJ relevant to the broader context in which it operates (Nesiah, 
2016:27). Likewise, it is important to appreciate institutions as tools, rather than aspirational goals, 
in achieving non-recurrence. The technical push towards the latter in Zimbabwe has consistently 
recreated “institutional fetishism” that has been co-opted by the ruling elites to suit their own 
interests (Nesiah, 2016:27). Elites often concede to institutional capacity building after ruptural 
episodes of violence as they recognise the need to consolidate their legitimacy within the narratives 
of functional ‘stateliness’ rather than heal society. Left unaddressed, “the absence of functioning 
centralised state institutions” renders countries failed states - a “byword for lawlessness” – which 
can be problematic to cementing legitimacy derived from the appearance of social cohesion from 
existing institutions (McEvoy, 2007:422).  
 
McEvoy (2007:423) notes that though developing a state’s institutional capacity is fundamental to 
rebuilding structures of governance, the rigid blueprint provided by traditional TJ interventions 
can act as a tool to further entrench anti-developmental elite interests. This highlights TJ as a state 
rather than a civic initiative. In Zimbabwe, this is done by enacting replicable institutional 
capacity enhancement to strengthen extractive elite interests or creating institutions for healing 
without intentional sincerity for change (Mnangagwa, 2018, in Tarusarira, 2019: 210). More than 
legalistic replications, the sine qua non precondition to reconstruction is a receptive political 
environment (McEvoy, 2007:423). Though this is pivotal, governments feigning collaboration in 
transition may also adopt the same approaches to consolidate their legitimisation (Mihr, 2013). To 
this end, the thesis argues for multidimensional engagements to the transformation project which 
must navigate elite interests to deliver social cohesion, institutional reform and thwart legacies of 
pervasive militarism (Khan, 2010; Mihr, 2013: 304-11). 
 
Significance of the Study  
 
The continued militarisation of the Zimbabwean state remains concerning for the socio-economic 
stability of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) region as well as sustainable 
social protections of Zimbabwean citizens in the country. Security Sector Reform (SSR) holds the 
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key to the development of the state. The conduct of the current Mnangagwa regime since 2017, 
like that of its predecessors, underscores the need for such reform. This thesis is, thus, timely and 
examines existing conversations on and around SSR in Zimbabwe, while exploring ways to nuance 
them. SSR, as in the case of militarisation, must be viewed as politicised within the tenets of 
governance (Brinkerhoff, 2005:9–11; Hutchful, 2000, in Ball et al., 2003:268; Chitiyo & Rupiya, 
2005:359). As Ball, Fayemi, Olonisakin, Williams, and Rupiya (2003) write: 
 
[o]ne of the major impediments to security sector reform and transformation in Africa has been the 
unwillingness of heads of state and government to accept the need for improvements in security-sector 
governance. A major reason for that unwillingness has been the dependency of these leaders on the 
security forces for their positions of power, and hence their economic well-being. (p. 294) 
 
As an application of the political settlements framework will show in this thesis, this has 
exacerbated civil-military relations in Zimbabwe and inhibited reform (Bratton, 2016:228). In so 
doing, the thesis further seeks to re-emphasise the positionality of securitised elites (securocrats) 
in perpetuating legacies of flawed institutional management, social cohesion, and development 
(Amoako, 2001, in Ball et al., 2003:264). The literature on political settlements is also useful in 
buttressing TJ-aligned understandings of the legacies of failed state reconstruction in Zimbabwe 
(McEvoy, 2007:421-4; Nesiah, 2016). Political settlements analysis can further help to decode the 
power politics that have shaped the country’s trajectory since independence.  
 
In confronting the political challenges of restructuring the security sector in present-day 
Zimbabwe, the thesis is aware that any single theoretical typology alone cannot be burdened with 
interrogating prospects for transforming civil-military relations in 2019. It, therefore, argues for 
multi-dimensional approaches in the search for solutions. 
 
Given Zimbabwe’s cyclical episodes of state securitisation, and the crucial importance of its 
stability for wider regional stability, the country presents as a complex case study that underscores 
the multifaceted nature of the security sector, while highlighting those institutional and elite facets 
that enable the sector’s divisive effects on the implementation of human security objectives 
(Hendricks & Hutton, 2009:12). Likewise, systemic legacies formed during transitional periods, 
which either disrupt or entrench cultures that nurse widespread political grievances, are 
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considered. These include, among others, the insulation of elite power, militarised hierarchies, and 
the silencing of dissent (both civic and political) as a perceived threat. In this regard, the thesis 
also interrogates the need to politicise future transitional processes. This is necessary to reviewing 
institutions towards sustainable, peaceful reform rather than have them as a goal of such reform 
(McEvoy, 2007: 421-3; Nesiah, 2016:27). Closing of the democratised space has long been a 
reason why justice processes sought by civil society lack political support (Thomson & Jazdowska, 
2012:77). There is a need, thus, to explore the legacy of exclusionary patron-client relations that 
have led to such cyclical closures. Any recommendations must also consider the prospects for 
inclusive development in a securitised state.  
 
The re-securitisation of the Zimbabwean state in the aftermath of Operation Restore Legacy – the 
2017 coup that ousted Mugabe from power – has increased the need to revisit SSR strategies noted 
by scholars, national organs as well as civic organisations in the search for holistic justice, 
inclusive development, and civic rights. New security sector governance challenges, which make 
use of political settlement frameworks to maximise elite interests and weaken prospects for TJ 
processes, remain a problem. Furthermore, an interrogation of the prospects for victims, who 
continue to be led by commanders of perpetrators, remains a valid exercise, as a research 
contribution towards sharpening both policy and civic interventions towards SSR and TJ. 
 
Method, Methodology, Ethics and Limitations  
 
This thesis uses a qualitative research methodology. In choosing not to include quantitative 
methods, I have been guided by a feminist approach to research. This approach speaks to the need 
to abandon positivism, which emphasises objectified knowledge as scientifically produced in the 
social sciences. Hence, this thesis’ acceptance of inherent, humanistic subjective interpretations – 
based on my standpoint during the research – is itself a contribution to the literature (Bhavnani, 
1994; Collins, 1990). The research method used to conduct this study consisted of reviewing 
secondary sources such as journal articles, books chapters, newspaper articles, and speeches – 
ranging from narratives by statesmen, to works by academics with varying ideologies and by 
technocrats from the Northern and Southern hemispheres alike.  
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All ethical considerations were noted. However, the thesis has discernible limitations. Victims of 
the militarised dynamics in Zimbabwe cut across epochs, class, age, and ethnicity. Yet, interviews 
were not conducted. First, given heightened securitisation and uncertainty in the state, conducting 
interviews was not astute – both in terms of physical safety and in terms of generating a resurgence 
of the trauma associated with retelling past instances of violence, without offering proper 
counselling to deal with it. Second, the aim was to explore which rectificatory needs are pressing 






























1. Detached Conversations: Contextualising Transitional Justice in Zimbabwe 
 
In April 2009, Article 7 of the GPA established the Organ of National Healing, Reconciliation and 
Integration (ONHRI) as part of its 100-day plan. This organ was mandated to what “might” be 
necessary for its perceptions of “national healing” and “reconciliation” without a direct action 
towards the exploration of truth and justice (Eppel, 2013:211-4; Hendricks & Hutton, 2009:10). 
Two key tenets of transitional justice were therefore invalidated before it began. In retrospect, the 
ONHRI was set up to unravel itself. The organ had neither an operational nor targeted advisory 
role. As Thomson and Jazdowska (2012:84) note, it operated within “a political and legal vacuum”. 
The ambiguousness of the clauses that mandated it towards national healing misconstrued the 
organ as a blueprint for implementation, when it was not (Bratton, 2016:221; Eppel, 2013:211-2). 
Rather, it was an advisory body that informed “what should be done, and not, as is sometimes 
claimed, to actually implement a process of national healing” (Matyszak & Reeler, 2011:4). 
Further testament to the view of the organ was that it was formed several months after the 2008 
political settlement and it was managed by bureaucratic state security agents. 
 
The ONHRI had three ministers in charge however they did not attend cabinet as they headed up 
an organ and not a ministry. These ministers inherited no enabling legislation, no budget, no staff 
and no bureaucratic framework. The reluctance for reform was also reflective in how the 
bureaucratic work was done by Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) staff from the office of 
the president (Bratton, 2016:221-2; Eppel, 2013:212; Ndlovu, 2019:14). The clauses that formed 
the organ bound parties to what “might” be needed to redress past violence and perpetration rather 
than what is tangible (Eppel, 2013:212). As Bratton (2016:221) notes, “the organ never established 
itself as a credible instrument for alleviating political violence”. This is buttressed, possibly 
unknowingly, by former Minister of State in the President's Office, and Co-Chair of the ONHRI 
at the time, John Landa Nkomo’s lauding of the “Zimbabwean project and program run by 
Zimbabweans…to immediately stop violence” (Bratton, 2016:221). Alas, one cannot stop violence 
that is cyclical and endemic without a commitment to redress and truth-telling (Nesiah, 2016:27-
8; Tarusarira, 2019:209-13). Nkomo, who later became Vice President of the country, illustrated 
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how wrong the perceptions of the function and durability of the organ were at the time among 
senior government officials. 
 
Concerns were raised about the political culture, replicated with the GNU, which consolidated 
political settlements within the elite (ICG, 2010:3-4). The exclusion of civil society removed the 
leveraging factor towards pushing for reforms that would benefit citizens rather than bargaining 
elites (Mani, 2008:255; Mutisi, 2011:4; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003:32; Thomson & Jazdowska, 
2012:88). The structure of the GPA was also dictated by Mugabe and ZANU-PF. The failures of 
the MDC to make tactful use of their two-thirds majority in parliament cost civil-society traction 
in realising legal reforms that would have weakened the president’s executive power. Specifically, 
the GPA could have included, for example, the authority to challenge the presidential powers 
which saw Mugabe appoint both the Attorney-General and the Reserve Bank Governor without 
consulting Tsvangirai, as mandated by the agreement itself (Matyszak & Reeler, 2011:4-6). 
Despite the MDC’s two-thirds majority in parliament, Constitutional Commissioners who are 
selected by a parliamentary committee were all ZANU-PF-aligned, “none of whom had any 
reputable democratic credentials” (Matyszak & Reeler, 2011:6). According to Kriger (2012:13), 
speculation persists that MDC elites were co-opted into ZANU-PF patron-client networks and 
forgot the role that they had to play in facilitating justice and democratisation. The demands for 
ZANU-PF’s survival were based on “the closure of democratic space” (Matyszak & Reeler, 
2011:6). As will be discussed in Chapter IV (1), patronage economies remain exclusionary in this 
way.  
 
In highlighting the tokenisation of TJ initiatives at the time, the ONHRI ministers themselves 
described the agreement as “a document of political compromise and has left unresolved issues 
which undermine their power to act” (Eppel, 2013:214; Bratton, 2016:227-8; Matyszak & Reeler, 
2011). Likewise, civil-military engagement was not adequately addressed during the GPA 
negotiations (ICG, 2010: 4). The lack of SSR in Zimbabwe resulted in the entrenched influence of 
securocrats as “the bedrock for ZANU-PF in political governance” (Mutisi, 2011: 4). Meanwhile, 
the ONHRI further revealed its position regarding the narrative for justice and transformation when 
Minister Moses Mzila-Ndlovu was arrested in 2011, for attending a prayer service commemorating 
the victims of the Gukurahundi Massacres – whose violations will be elaborated on in Chapter III 
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(2). The organ was powerless in influencing change in the deteriorating security situation in the 
rural areas between 2010 and 2012 in the run up to elections (Bratton, 2016:221-2; Eppel, 
2013:211). The security sector in 2019, as was in 2008, remains within ZANU-PF control and 
there remain no prospects for reform as many “[s]elective arrests for political violence and 
impunity for security sector perpetrators” still occur (Eppel, 2013:213). The ONHRI failed on 
delivering accountability towards healing but succeed in its ambiguous mandate on what was 
probable in theory rather than reality. 
 
Further superficial provisions for transitional justice were signed into effect in the 22 May 2013 
Constitutional Amendment. The ONHRI was dissolved in the same year, after Mugabe announced 
his new cabinet, which saw the creation of the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission 
(NPRC) on 18 August 2013 under Sections 251, 252 and 2531 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, 
Amendment (No. 20) Act, 2013. Though there was no clear scope and a decade long tenure, 
Mugabe had seen the political benefits in calling for peace as seen in aforementioned 
interpretations of the need for ‘stateliness’ (Bratton, 2016:221; McEvoy, 2007:421-4). The ONHRI 
and the NPRC, established in 2014, may have well been created by ZANU-PF to be “pragmatic 
mechanism that can be gestured to whenever the issue of accountability is raised” (Eppel, 
2013:214). In this, deterring progress in TJ for Zimbabwe as their decisions are centralised in 
executive authority. For Raftopoulos (2013a:972), “a reconstitution of the political terrain in 
Zimbabwe” was shown in ZANU-PF regaining power in 2013. The GNU had clearly not put an 
end to impunity despite 75% of the 2,400 adult Zimbabwean citizens who participated in the survey 
preferring prosecution of perpetrators of political violence by July 2012 (Afrobarometer, 2012, in 
Bratton, 2016:226). 
 
Much of this violence took place at the intra community level, and took the form of neighbours against 
neighbours, or even of family members brutally attacking other members. Within ten weeks, appalling 
damage was done to the social fabric in rural villages across the nation. Almost every victim of this violence 
can name at least some of their perpetrators, as they are from their local ZANU PF and war vet structures, or 
are local youth forced into taking part in beating those known to be MDC activists or supporters (Eppel, 
2009b:1).  
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Endemic violence remains transferrable in communities especially when it has not been dealt with 
(Mani, 2008:259-60). The result of the violence noted above was further violence inflicted through 
retaliatory violence or the continued freedom of perpetrators in society which further traumatised 
victims (Eppel, 2009b:1). The GPA repeated the mistakes of the 1987 Unity Accord as it was a 
political settlement that was brokered by elites pursuing their interests. The result of limited civil 
society engagement was an over-adherence to power sharing rather than redress of societal ills 
(Mutisi, 2011:4; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003:31-3). This structure reinforced a ZANU-PF chain of 
command as the GPA “contained no method by which Articles relating to democratic reforms 
could be enforced” (Matyszak & Reeler, 2011:6). Considering gestured peacebuilding processes, 
a failed GNU and a trust deficit in government-led initiatives, these provisions are a mockery to 
the promotion of peace and reconciliation in the country given the cancerous political culture that 
inhibits reform. Unsurprisingly, the NPRC has failed to affect tangible change on the ground 
(Eppel, 2013). 
 
Current ambitions towards actual TJ in Zimbabwe are constrained by non-governmental actor 
efforts. To this end, the NTJWG which works as a parallel civic structure to the NPRC was 
established in 2014. Housed at the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum and established by 46 
non-state TJ stakeholders in Zimbabwe, the NTJWG continues to work with government and 
citizens to redress past wrongs. It does so with its focus on 6 thematic areas: Promotion of Truth; 
Justice and Accountability; Reparations and Guarantees of Non-Recurrence; Memorialisation; 
Gender and Institutional Reforms (Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, 2014:1-3). Reflecting 
on the 2018 NTJWG Transitional Justice Policy Symposium Report, recommendations to “build 
strong institutions that act above party politics” shows a lack of understanding of endemic civil-
military relations present in Zimbabwe (NTJWG, 2018:25). Such strategies for institutional reform 
and SSR render some recommendations presented as tokenistic at best. Likewise, 
recommendations for the NPRC to provide clauses that obligate governmental authorities to 
implement recommendations will not work whilst securocrats who are currently in power are 
implicated and national institutions such as the judiciary are under a captured security community 
(NTJWG, 2018:24). As Michael Bratton (2016:228) points out, “[a]s long as ZANU-PF’s coalition 
of civil-military elites remains the dominant power in the land, prospects for transitional justice in 
Zimbabwe are limited”. This has been seen in the lack of reform in the crossover from the Mugabe 
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regime to the Mnangagwa regime. Intricacies of this systemic recurrence will be expanded on in 
Chapter V of the thesis.  
 
Additional recommendations for Zimbabwe to learn from best international practices and “draw 
lessons from other jurisdictions” bare imprudence given the legacy of limited political will in the 
country and the flawed AU transitional justice policies (NTJWG, 2018:24). Elaborating on the 
latter, Article 95 of the 2019 African Union Transitional Justice Policy (AUTJP) which notes 
normative practices for successful and political institutional reform still makes limited reference 
to the urgent need for SSR in the work of post-conflict reconstruction on the continent. 
Additionally, in Article 41 of the 2013 African Union Policy Framework on Security Sector 
Reform, “Heads of State and Government, members of Cabinet and other coordinating officials 
that assist the Executive in the execution of their functions, [continue to be mandated to] direct the 
security sector” (AUC, 2013:17; AUC, 2019:19; NTJWG, 2018:14, 24). This essential 
legitimisation of the personalisation of power by securocrats is seen through violations to be 
discussed in Chapter III (2) which the Mnangagwa regime notes as justifiable.  
 
To illustrate a lack of political will from the executive, in 2018, five years into the supposed tenure 
of the NPRC, the government was yet to clearly establish the start and subsequent lifespan of the 
commission owing to parliamentary delays (Chitagu, 2019; NTJWG, 2018:13). Buttressing this, 
Justice Joseph Masufire noted Section 251 as “the most ambiguous provision in the Constitution” 
whilst presiding over the issue of the NPRC’s tenure in February 2019. Concillia Chinanzvavana 
of the MDC Alliance had challenged President Mnangawa to extend the tenure of the NPRC in 
Masvingo’s High Court. Despite this, the call for retributive justice on the ground is strong. When 
questioned on attitudes towards TJ in 2018, 70% of the 2,400 adult Zimbabwean citizens who 
participated in an Afrobarometer survey in 20182 wanted to see perpetrators of past violations held 
to account through prosecution. This was in comparison to 28% of participants who wanted 
perpetrators to be granted amnesty (Bratton & Masunungure, 2018b:14-5). As such, the mandate 
of the NPRC must be extended beyond its ten-year mandate beyond 19 August 2023 (Chitagu, 
2019).  
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Given this, the NTJWG’s calls for the inclusion of the state in TJ processes due to “its involvement 
and control of the infrastructures of violence and conflict” (NTJWG, 2018:23) thus lead one to 
question such an olive branch from civil society which is to be met with a disingenuous nod from 
elites. Such probes are sustained by public declarations by President Mnangagwa such as his 
January 2018 interview at the World Economic Forum in Davos. Here, Mnangagwa expresses his 
government’s TJ mandate as “nothing more than [him] putting legislation” for a commission of 
inquiry to draft recommendations (Mnangagwa, 2018, in Tarusarira, 2019:210). He goes on to 
dismiss commitments to address, apologise to, and compensate victims for past violations such as 
the 1982-1987 Gukurahundi Massacres to which he was a key architect (Coltart, 2016:134). 
Furthermore, in a failed bid to bring “closure” to affected families of the Gukurahundi Massacres 
in April 2019, the Mnangagwa regime pledged to facilitate the exhumation and re-burial of victims 
who remain in mass burial sites across Matabeleland and Midlands provinces. President 
Mnangagwa’s disregard for the need to apologise further shows disingenuous efforts towards 
transformative remorse (Moyo, 2019c; Mutsaka, 2019). 
 
The lack of progression in domestic and continental policy restricts the legitimate formation of a 
“Victims and Witness Protection Act” as recommended in the report (NTJWG, 2018:28). 
Moreover, fear exists with the ordinary person recognising this institution as an instrument of the 
state given the omnipresence of state-sponsored organised violence and torture on those who 
testify against the government narrative. The assumption that victims and survivors will be 
comfortable with revisiting their trauma reflects practitioner insensitivity on sites of historical and 
structural trauma. This is especially true for perpetrations that have had a significant number of 
years pass in their aftermath (Eppel, 2013:231; LaCapra, 1999:721-7; Ndlovu, 2019:240). 
 
There is no doubt that potential merits of transitional justice are recognisable to those seeking 
actual reform. Ideally, “justice measures that are employed in transitional times not only create a 
culture of accountability, but also are a form of political restructuring [by limiting] governmental 
power and also construct the transition” (Moyo, 2019b:188). For Zimbabwe though, the facilitation 
of a ‘liberal’ democratic state is currently, and has always been, at odds with the political will of 
the state and its elites.  This is measurable given past and present opportunities to structure political 
settlements in ways that broker national peace, healing and reconciliation (Eppel, 2013:211-50). 
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As a liberal aspiring concept, TJ suffers an ideological disjuncture within a state such as Zimbabwe 
were civil-military culture is based on right-wing ideologies (de Waal, 2002; Teitel, 2000:4). TJ is 
enacted through positive “institutional and individual reputation, esteem, and legitimacy, these 
processes of communication and socialization” (Dancy et al., 2013:8) which contribute to a shift 
in political cultures and behavioural changes. Mani (2008, in Eppel, 2013:221) warns that TJ 
practitioners must be wary as perpetration is often “by the same war criminals with the same 
abusive, violent and exploitative means and devastating effects on victims”. Endemic violence 
remains a problem in Zimbabwe.  
 
 
1.1 Articulating Justice and Endemic Impunity  
 
Though other methods of engagement are discussed throughout the thesis; rectificatory, 
distributive and legal justice are three dimensions of justice that may be engaged with during 
moments of transition (Mani, 2002:5). From a state-level analysis, judicial legal processes precede 
rectificatory and distributive justice. Though legalism provides a solid base towards delivering 
justice, real life experiences present limitations to delivering justice through singular lenses of 
legal practice. Lived experiences must be accommodated and amplified in the TJ process. 
Likewise, rectificatory justice in Zimbabwe must facilitate the cessation of state-sponsored 
violence against citizens, open-up the civil society space, all whilst demilitarising government 
politics and the institutions that support it. Such actions would help repair the civic trust deficit 
(Bratton & Masunungure, 2018b; Eppel, 2013; McEvoy, 2007:421-3, 440).  
 
In Zimbabwe, Chapter 10:32, Section 10(1)(d) of the NPRC Act of 2018 allows for collaboration 
with the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) which regularly performs executive orders of 
subversion under Public Order and Security Act (POSA) of 2002, as well as the Maintenance of 
Peace and Order Act (MOPA) of 2019 (NPRC, 2018). In January 2019, the ZRP was part the 
violent crackdown against fuel-hike protestors that saw “15 deaths, 340 injured, and more than 
1,000 arrests” (Simpson & Krönke, 2019:1). If the NPRC continues to work with an unreformed 
security community – even in the name of collaboration with government – there will be a 
maintenance of a violent social order. Engagements during moments of transition or political 
settlements are also difficult when the judiciary, as part of the security community, remains 
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captured by securocrats who control state functions (Ball et al., 2003:265; ICG, 2010:11-3). Given 
this, the cumulative effects of a lack of accountability and truth-telling are trust deficits such as 
those which remain in Zimbabwean communities. The denial of justice found in protectionist civil-
military relations compromise legitimacy, effectiveness and security as the three dimensions of 
progressive governance which affect prospects for social cohesion and growth (Brinkerhoff, 
2005:9-11). Albeit this, it is important to refute the simplistic assumption that TJ efforts will 
proceed in Zimbabwe once the rule of law and the credibility of the judiciary as an institution have 
been restored given the legacy of endemic silences and denialisms in the state by governing 
officials (Eppel, 2013:213; Moyo, 2019b:9).  
 
Goredema (2004:103–104) notes that a differently structured judiciary at independence was more 
likely to have transformed the public space and delivered societal transformation under the guise 
of demographic representation. This is buttressed by Chitiyo’s (2009:26) observations about the 
flawed nature of the 1979 Lancaster House Agreement. Additionally, Eppel (2013:213) notes that 
“the excesses of the liberation war were amnestied in 1979 and 1980”, rather than addressed. 
Coltart (2016) similarly laments:  
 
crimes [from 1978], along with atrocities committed by all the armies in the war, were never prosecuted 
as they were covered by an amnesty agreed to by all the parties to the Lancaster House settlement in 
1979. The amnesty, combined [with] the absence of any truth commission, resulted in these horrors 
never being confronted and dealt with, as they should have been. The use of torture within our security 
forces remains a plague in our nation. (p. 85) 
 
In 1981, the Entumbane Uprisings saw fatal clashes between Zimbabwe African National 
Liberation Army (ZANLA) and Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) ex-combatants 
Resultantly, the government called for the 1981 Dumbutshena Commission to be set up. Again, in 
1983, the Chihambakwe Commission of Inquiry was set up after a call for investigations into the 
killing of a supposed 1,500 political dissidents in the Midlands and Matabeleland regions – the 
forewarning of what we now know as the 1982-1987 Gukurahundi Massacres. Both reports were 
finalised and submitted to President Mugabe though they were never released for public 
consumption as government said it feared the resurgence of revenge violence (Catholic 
Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP), 1997; Huyse, 2003; Murambadoro & Wielenga, 
MANDIPA NDLOVU   MPHIL DISSERTATION 
 
27 
2015:35-6; Ndou, 2012; Zimbabwe Independent, 2019). This is indicative of both pervasive 
cultures of impunity and the amnesia legalised through executive power to apply amnesties which 
command persistent denials of justice for victims and survivors of state-sponsored violence 
(Ricœur, 2003:353, in McEvoy & Mallinder, 2012:414). 
 
As was the colonial legacy of impunity, the Zimbabwean ruling elite adopted the British tradition 
of tokenised commissions of inquiry which – particularly in settler colonies – often purported to 
take the voices of the victims of colonial violence into account yet neutralised justice through the 
courts by granting amnesties to perpetrators (Sitze, 2013:11-4). The tactical legacy of silencing of 
victims through the granting of amnesties to perpetrators has been one of the biggest impediments 
to accessing justice in Zimbabwe. Despite this, ‘judicial rhetoric’ within the discourse of 
commissions of enquiry allows for the state to portray a narrative of lamentation despite 
sponsoring the violence at hand (Sitze, 2013:14). The endemic problem exacerbates challenges to 
non-recurrence of violence and injustice whilst further wielding control of state institutions and 
the providence of social protections to securocrats and the elite networks which maintain them. To 
illustrate this, Constitution of Zimbabwe, Amendment (No. 20) Act, 2013, Chapter 12 advocates 
for independent commissions to be set up towards democratic advancement in the country. Section 
235 of the same document however specifies the commissions as independent yet they are “not 
subject to control by any external actors (including political actors), they remain accountable to 
the parliament” which is inundated by ruling elite loyalists (Murambadoro & Wielenga, 2015:37-
8).  
 
Under the 1983-1990 State of Emergency, human rights abuses continued despite the declarations 
of peace under the façade of national healing and reconciliation. Eppel (2004:50), commenting on 
the cumulative effects of tokenised pardons, states that: “the 1988 amnesty was one in a long line 
of amnesties since 1979 and is part of an established pattern of perpetrators being pardoned at the 
expense of victim”. This further revealed strategies towards an ulterior political agenda by ZANU-
PF in their quest to solidify their power (Amnesty International, 2002:16-9; Bratton, 2016:220; 
Coltart, 2016:149-155; Ndlovu, 2019:144; Scarnecchia, 2011:93). Commenting on the 
constitutional clemency clause in their report Zimbabwe: The toll of impunity, Amnesty 
International note that, 




“[i]n the 1953 constitution of Rhodesia, this clause empowered the governor and later the head of state to 
effectively grant a pardon to any person convicted of a crime. In the 1969 constitution, this power of pardon 
was widened to allow the head of state to grant clemency to those involved in criminal activities – whether 
they have been convicted or before there is a determination of guilt. In the [Zimbabwean Constitution 
preceding the 2013 Amendment] Section 31(i) gives the President the right to grant a pardon, amnesty or 
clemency to those convicted or due to be convicted of a crime. There are no definite criteria spelled out to 
limit this power or provide for further review by Zimbabwean society, and therefore it can be used to reinforce 
impunity for perpetrators of human rights violations” (Amnesty International, 2002:16). 
 
The Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Act (No.7) of 1987 replaced the role of the Prime 
Minister. This further centralised power and personalised control within the office of the President. 
Again in 1995, pardons once again granted to perpetrators of electoral violence justified by 
“presidential discretion to prevent prosecution of party cadres guilty of acts of political 
intimidation” (Bratton, 2016:220; Eppel, 2013:213). At the turn of the century, the trend was clear 
when the Clemency Order of 2000 was granted for kidnappings and torture. Rape, murder and 
fraud violations were excluded to create an impression of future accountability but were instead 
considered “beyond the reach of the justice system” (Amnesty International, 2002:19). The 
cyclical effects of state-sanctioned organised violence and torture have continued towards 
elections where manipulation often occurs and violence is unleashed when ZANU-PF authority is 
challenged. In 2008, following a 47.9% win by the MDC in the presidential vote, widespread 
violence and torture was unleashed on citizens. Even with over 2000 civilian deaths and over 100 
officers indicted, military General Chedondo defended the actions of the security forces as a 
defence to President Mugabe’s integrity and legitimacy (BBC, 2008; Human Rights Watch, 
2008:13-20; Moore, 2014:118). This is reflective of a flawed governance structure and a 
compromised judiciary as the powers of Section 31(i) of the Lancaster Constitution were invoked.  
 
There are fundamental impediments to undertaking transformative efforts in post-colonial 
Zimbabwe. Pivoting on legacies of amnesties, these include, but are not limited to: 
 
halting criminal investigations against perpetrators, preventing victims from receiving compensation, 
obscuring who gave [the] order to commit violence, preventing the investigation by human rights 
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defenders and the independent media of abuses, and creating the impression that future violations would 
be officially condoned. (Bratton, 2016: 220) 
 
These tactics are steeped in inherited colonial legacies (Amnesty International, 2002:16; 
Goredema, 2004:103-4). Ruling elites have always used the law for the protection of the security 
community as “[c]olonial injustices were legalised by unjust laws” (Eppel, 2013:213). The 
legacies of the captured judiciary have continued to contribute to the denialism of governing 
officials regarding the existence of, or their involvement in, violence in Zimbabwe. To date, 
“[j]udicial positions are not attained by election in Zimbabwe” (Goredema, 2004:103). The Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court and other justices are appointed by the President at the advice of the 
Judicial Service Commission. This remains a problem where repressive legislation such as as the 
Law and Order Maintenance Act (LOMA) of 1960,  Public Order and Security Act (POSA) of 
2002, and Maintenance of Peace and Order Act (MOPA) of 2019 are assented to as legitimating 
provisions of violence within the law and maintain cyclical legacies of colonial repression 
(Bratton, 2016:237; Langa, 2019). Likewise, with local and international criticism not a deterrent, 
government continues to regard itself as “superior to the judiciary and to have the license to pick 
and choose which decisions to comply with and which to ignore” (Goredema, 2004:105). This is 
further testament to the lack of commitment to institutional reconstruction (Bratton, 2016:26; 
Eppel, 2013:226-7; Thomson & Jazdowska, 2012:81-3).  
 
This thesis takes the view that, should current political cultures persist, amnesties will continue to 
be “serial amnesties” (Bratton, 2016:220) granted whilst presidential immunities and the power to 
grant them exist in Zimbabwe’s Constitution. Entered into force on 22 May 2013, the Constitution 
of Zimbabwe Amendment Act (No. 20) repealed the 1979 Lancaster House Constitution. This 
followed from Article VI of the GPA that granted Zimbabweans the right to construct their own 
Constitution that focused on socio-economic rather than civil-political rights (Raftopolous, 
2013a:972). For liberation nationalists, the rule of law was never “a means to political victory”; 
rather, it was “a standard against which the Rhodesian Front could be held up and found wanting” 
(Alexander, 2011:556). The liberation war was a means to establishing a vaguely defined “people’s 
power” through the destruction of the colonial state and its legalistic controls (Mandaza, 1991:71-
90, in Raftopolous, 2013a:972).  
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Given this, divergences were illuminated between these and other political actors (the opposition 
MDC, civil society, amongst others) during constitutional drafting deliberations (Raftopolous, 
2013a:974). Despite finding consensus to draft the new Constitution, pre-held notions on the rule 
of law may explain the retention of certain the provisions of the Constitutional of Zimbabwe 
Amendment Act (No.7) of 1987. For instance, Section 98 speaks to presidential immunity to be 
retained in accordance to the “good faith” of the president however the personalisation of power 
to suit bargaining elite interests (Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2013; Khan, 2005:11). This is 
reflective of the Indemnity and Compensation Law of 1975 which “granted prospective approval 
for all acts undertaken in the course of official duty” (Bratton, 2016:219). This “good faith” 
provision assured immunity for security personnel inciting violence and made legal immunity 
subjective where perpetrators could claim just motives for torture and violation (CCJP, 1976 in 
Bratton, 2016:219). Other entrenched assurances for the ruling elite are developed in Chapter III 
(3).  
 
Political cultures devoid of accountability continue to allow the government to engage in systemic 
subversion of their citizens’ human rights. (Scarnecchia, 2011:93). In negotiating amnesties, one 
needs to interrogate the impact of their deliverance in the absence of truth and subsequent 
accountability. McEvoy and Mallinder (2012:413) refer to amnesties as “the process by which 
states exercise their sovereign right to mercy by extinguishing criminal or civil liability for past 
crimes”. In Zimbabwe, presidential mercy is granted to perpetrators who execute orders towards 
violent subversion from elites. Here perpetration is recognised however the possibility of 
persecution is negated. Amnesties fall under the assumption of the formation of a new political 
settlement within communities based in revelations and acceptance of the truth. Mani (2008:255) 
however reminds us that even the best truth commissions are “narrow and limited if the mechanism 
does not go beyond the handful of individual perpetrators prosecuted and if the victims are not 
acknowledged and vindicated”. Generally, amnesties are “linked…to processes designed to 
encourage former combatants to offer truth in return for non-prosecution” (McEvoy & Mallinder, 
2012:415, see also, 432). Broad-based truth-seeking initiatives at national level bare the potential 
of uncovering injustices and manipulation of institutions (Mani, 2008:256). In Zimbabwe 
however, securocrats face no tangible consequences that would propose workable solutions for 
their removal from spaces of influence or prosecution (Hendricks & Hutton, 2009:12-3). The result 
MANDIPA NDLOVU   MPHIL DISSERTATION 
 
31 
is that there have been too few expressions of truth juxtaposed against too many amnesties granted 
without the exchange of the prior. This shall be elaborated in Chapter III (1). For now, framing 
political will remains important. 
 
 
2. Framing Patronage and Political Settlements in Zimbabwe 
 
A pivotal concept in understanding the political will of elites in Zimbabwe, is clientelism as a 
practice in their political settlements. Political settlements can be defined as “social orders 
characterized by distributions of organi[s]ational power that together with specific formal and 
informal institutions effectively achieve at least the minimum requirements of political and 
economic sustainability for [a given] society” (Khan, 2018: 670-671). Di John and Putzel (2009: 
4) outline the typology as “consensual understanding[s] of the best interests of all actors, usually 
political elites, as administered by institutes of political power”. As such, the application of 
political settlements is an outcome of “complex organi[s]ational agency interactions” thus 
rendering them contextually specific and fluid (Khan, 2018:692). Within political settlements, 
clientelism is an exchange of varied benefits for individual interests in the form of tenure as well 
as access to rents and services between individuals or privileged groups of unequal socio-political 
statuses (Arias, 2006, and Hilgers, 2011, in Miltin, 2013:6). Rents must be distinguished from 
resources. 
 
Rents are excess incomes that accrue to factors of production in uncompetitive markets, for example, 
the rents that accrue to a government-created monopoly, or to economic actors in pre-capitalist settings. 
In neo-classical economic analyses, rents and the effort expended on securing them (rent-seeking) are 
regarded as unproductive and inefficient. Partly in consequence, the term “rent” has acquired a generally 
pejorative connotation in development circles. (Dawson & Kelsall, 2013:50) 
 
Dynamics in patron-client power relations dictate distribution of rents and resources in patronage 
economies and neutral citizens remain excluded from these benefits albeit their grievances 
(Hickey, 2015). Such economies are characterised by a culture of elite accumulation and control 
over state resources in what Alexander and McGregor (2013:758) refer to as a “‘survivalist’ form 
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of livelihood”. Elites linked to ZANU-PF, as will be discussed in the thesis, sanction degrees of 
clientelism in survivalist political settlements to this end. 
 
Khan notes the origins of neopatrimonial analyses through Weber’s rational bureaucratic model of 
governance (Weber, 1978:1006-1110 in Khan, 2005:10). This model was characterised by the 
administration of economic growth supported by traditional sources of authority and legitimacy in 
pre-modern and pre-capitalist societies by ruling elites. Here, patrimonialism was identified as 
“one of the most important of these pre-capitalist forms of governance, where allegiance to a leader 
[was] based on personal loyalty and traditional legitimacy” (Weber, 1978:1006-1110, in Khan, 
2005:10). This is buttressed by Mkandawire who reminds us that the concept of neopatrimonialism 
itself is not new. The author notes that “[i]n its early incarnation, it was not about corruption or 
weakness of the state. Rather, it was simply a way to exercise power that incorporated Weberian 
forms of patrimonialism and rational-legal authority” (Eisenstadt, 1966, in Mkandawire, 
2015:565). In the post-Cold War period, with modern waves of capitalism, the modern state has 
adapted. 
 
Rational bureaucratic forms of rule now create conditions for capitalism supported by democracy 
which is essential for the survival of modern democratic states within the global capitalist system. 
Neopatrimonialism is a term used to describe “different styles of exercising authority” that must 
be nuanced across cultures, societies and states (Mkandawire, 2015:564). According to Khan 
(2010:10), respect for the rule of law within the bureaucratic structure allows for strengthened 
institutional capacities which, for the most part, allow formal institutions to execute their mandates 
impartially at distance from elite patrons. Modern postcolonial developing states – particularly in 
Africa – have however been classified as neopatrimonialist in attempts to “explain the persistence 
of pre-modern state [governance] structures” in modern times (Khan, 2005:11; Mkandawire, 
2015:564). Van de Welle (2001:51) cites that African political authorities are traditionally derived 
from “dyadic exchanges that [are present in] the village to the highest reaches of the central state”. 
It must however be noted that current “approach to patronage, corruption and ‘parallel structures’” 
are not in line with traditional African values (McGregor, 2013:786).  
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Van de Welle highlights neopatrimonialism seen in “hybrid” African regimes such as Nigeria and 
Zaire under Mobutu Sese Seko as instances where states are bureaucratically sound in theory yet 
“constantly subverted by a patrimonial logic” in practice (Boone, 1992, Callaghy, 1984, and 
Joseph, 1987, in van de Welle, 2001:51-2). Mkwandawire (2015:572), commenting on the 
contextual specificity of neopatrimonialism across the continent, notes that “the exercise of 
extracting a logic that explains Africa’s poor economic performance is extremely complex and 
ultimately arbitrary”. The author warns of the dangers of homogenising African narratives of 
neopatrimonialism through “preanalytical dispossessions” of one’s own biased cultural lenses. 
Each case must thus be examined specifically as contexts vary (Mkwandawire, 2015:572). 
 
Widely accepted though, is the state of corruption which is typically embedded in networks of 
access in neopatrimonialism. The tenets of this are then linked to clientelism and justified by elites 
as mere exchanges for elite safeguarding (Tendi, 2013; van de Welle, 2001:51-2). Patron-client 
relations are solidified when “clients agree to provide political support to the patron in exchange 
for payoffs that the patron can deliver by using political power to capture public resources” (Khan, 
2005:10). Tenets of clientelism are then illuminated through prebends, patronage and tributes 
which act as navigators of continuous political settlements by including and excluding bargaining 
elites as well as citizens from social protections within societies. ZANU-PF has used, and 
continues to use, such tactics for the renegotiation of political, economic and social control in 
Zimbabwe (Raftopolous, 2009; Tendi, 2013:841).  
 
 
2.1 The State of Patronage Organisation  
 
Patronage economies are founded in internal elite settlements to accumulate public resources. This 
is to ensure not only elite power, but also elite stability (Alexander & McGregor, 2013:758; Moore, 
2012; van de Walle, 2001:16). A key tenet of such neopatrimonialism is “the personalisation of 
power” (Khan, 2005:11). This is different to a rule-following Weberian-type state where formal 
institutions are typically impersonal (Khan, 2010:10). Patron-client organisation within ruling 
elites is divided by horizontal and vertical distributions of power (Khan, 2010:64). Understanding 
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patron-client organisation within ruling coalitions is pivotal to understanding how it translates into 
the way patron elites interact with clients outside of the elite sphere as well as with neutral citizens. 
 
Horizontal distributions of power lie in excluded factions exerting power over the ruling elite and 
the internal distribution of power within the ruling elite. Weak horizontal, excluded coalitions 
allow the ruling elite to feel secure in their tenure. In theory, this would motivate the ruling elite 
to focus on growth and development strategies, rather than on factionalism and opposition; 
however, in practice, the politics of accumulation and loyalism take over (Chitiyo, 2009; Khan, 
2010: 64–65; Tendi, 2013). In vertical distributions of power, there exist higher and lower levels 
of internal coalitions that are included and excluded from those in the upper level with executive 
access respectively. Though the lower levels typically depend on those in the upper levels in 
patron-client relations, they can sometimes mobilise bargaining power and limit implementation 
of issues of concern to the upper levels if their needs are not met (Khan, 2010: 65). The more 
powerful those who are excluded become from the periphery become, the more those with 
executive access seek to thwart them (Khan, 2010:65). These key political differences, however, 
focus on formal, rather than informal, distributions of power that affect the ruling coalition. 
Informality can be seen through external interference of the security community, business 
networks, and other clients, where government officials are assumed to be impartial bureaucrats. 
This is, however, not the case in Zimbabwe, where securocrats form the ruling elite in the ZANU-
PF party and government (Khan, 2010; Tendi, 2013). 
 
Khan’s (2010: 64–66) model of horizontal and vertical distributions of power within elite political 
settlements must be extended to analysing asymmetric power relations between the citizen and the 
state, when examining the endemic nature of clientelism in Zimbabwe. Horizontal distributions of 
power must be sampled as patron-client relations evident within the elite bargaining space, and 
vertical distributions of power as the expansion of ruling elite control through alliances within 
broader society (Kriger, 2012: 13). Exclusive horizontal distributions of rents expressed in this 
adaptation impede access to socio-economic justice for wider society, whilst adapted vertical 
networks solidify these constraints through displays of loyalty towards the ruling elite. Ideally, 
spreading resources within society would facilitate greater access and subsequent prosperity for 
the average person. In Zimbabwe, however, the vertical allocation of resources has been 
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characterised by widespread horizontal-type settlements with elite loyalists, thus producing anti-
development outcomes. Examples of this will be considered in Chapter IV (1). These are evident 
through widespread violent subversion and patron-client relations which cripple the functioning 
of institutions meant to safeguard citizen interests. Consequently, such exclusionary institutions 
inhibit incentives for people to save, invest, and innovate by supporting a culture of patronage 
which erodes the rule of law, creates insecurity in property rights, and in general, creates economic 
disincentives. In Zimbabwe, cyclical fiscal crises from 1997 have persisted as a result. This 
subsequently prevents rent generation and drains the economy of vital state resources, whilst 
protecting elite interests (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2013:371-410; Dawson & Kelsall, 2013; van de 
Welle, 2001:51-3).  
 
Access dependent on power politics is key in analysing the Zimbabwean case. As a concept, power 
politics is characterised by a hierarchy of political settlements that enable its existence (Bratton, 
2016). To gain power, one must have privileged access to a limited or elite network and subvert 
alternative networks that challenge its survival (Di John & Putzel, 2009:14; Kelsall, 2018; Khan, 
2010:5; Kriger, 2012). The maintenance of hegemony through power politics “involves both 
consent and coercion” (Moore, 1991:474). Hegemonies are both strong and weak. Stronger 
hegemonies include more actors within society in the political settlement deemed acceptable for a 
given society’s narrative. Weaker hegemonies allow ruling elites to control the dominant narrative 
(Miliband, 1990:7, in Moore, 1991:474). A “critical factor” for consent in such hegemonies is for 
the ruling elite to attain legitimacy. This, however, often occurs through repressive apparatuses, 
whereby elites safeguard interests for their survival and seek to remain unopposed (Therborn, 
1980:109, and Weitzer, 1990, in Moore, 1991:475).  
 
Amongst bargaining elites in Zimbabwe, the weaker form exists where power is centred in ruling 
elitist choices thus failing to advance citizens’ needs (Sylvester, 1990:399 in Moore, 1991:474). 
Arguments that free the MDC from such criticism miss the understandings of a persistent lack of 
appeal to the rural voter and failure to perform during the GNU for the main opposition party. 
These form plausible rebuttals for a lack of evolution of the MDC since it entered the political 
arena in the late 1990s. This despite cautions for the opposition party to not posture themselves in 
the elitism of the urban voter and the ruling class. A weaker rebuttal of this argument can however 
MANDIPA NDLOVU   MPHIL DISSERTATION 
 
36 
be made that even during the GNU, the MDC had no real opportunities at exerting political power 
(Hoffman, 2012:144; Kriger, 2012:13; Matyszak & Reeler, 2011). 
 
Matyszak and Reeler (2011:57), Tendi (2013:841) and van de Welle (2001:52-3) cite the 
maintenance of power by weak hegemonies, through the tenets of clientelism and electoral 
violence by the president, as key to understanding the nature of elite power dynamics. Ideally, it 
would be possible that factions within the ruling elite favouring democratic capacity building of 
the state could empower civil society to be strong enough to form a counter-hegemonic movement 
and allow for the opening-up of the democratic space. This would create a stronger hegemonic 
base with legitimacy steeped in societal consent (Moore, 1991:477). In practice, Zimbabwe 
remains far from this realisation in 2019. In states where electoral legitimacy is absent, patron-
client networks form the basis of continued political access for factions of the ruling elites. These 
factions concern themselves with self-preservation through strategic loyalties rather than 
preservation through society. The president, as the centre of power in the state, shapes subsequent 
resources and policies around narratives surrounding him and his legitimised networks (Tendi, 
2013:837-41; van de Welle, 2001:52-3).  
 
Both formal and informal networks within and outside of political power structures are necessary 
to examine to gain a holistic picture of various actors present in the political arena (Kriger, 2012). 
As Khan (2010:5) highlights, “the exercise of power in developing countries cannot simply be 
focused on the protection and operation of formal institutions”. These networks are not all based 
within the structures of the state and party systems as there are groupings within political networks 
which are outside formal institutions that have disruptive potential (Kelsall, 2018; Khan, 2010:5). 
Examining vertical and horizontal distributions of resources allows for deeper insights into the 
nuanced nature of clientelism. When clientelism is based on the “extensive use of state resources 
for political purposes”, economic justice remains challenged by privileged beneficiaries (van de 
Welle, 2001:52). Given this, variations of both horizontal distribution within the ZANU-PF elite 
and vertical distribution to auxiliary networks are not to be viewed as mutually exclusive when 
examining the Zimbabwean case (Behuria et al., 2017:512; Khan, 2010:64–5; van de Welle, 
2001:51-3).  
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To further clarify, limitations to accessing power in Zimbabwe do not translate into the country 
operating within a limited access order. Despite powerful elites possessing the social tools that 
allow them to keep their power, as well as access to rents and resources being limited within elite 
networks, the process of accumulation does not allow the political system to manipulate “the 
economy to create rents as a means of solving the problem of violence” (North et al., 2007:3). 
Instead, the lack of rent creation and the extraction of the few rents and resources produced by the 
economy for elite enrichment, breed more violence, as they breed a lack of social protections. 
Physical subversion, fear, and structural violence are understood as tools for elite preservation, 
rather than as risks that may cost elites their power. Additional complications lie in the 
militarisation of the elite space of Zimbabwe, which will be discussed later. Current prospects for 
political cooperation outside this narrative remain slim (Dawson & Kelsall, 2013; Khan, 2010; 

























1. Selective Truths, Silenced Communities  
 
The ruling ZANU-PF’s mandate has been to appease various members within the security 
community to secure elite interests. This is done by solidifying Zimbabwe’s roots as a highly-
securitised state. Chuma (2004:124) notes that the public broadcaster, Zimbabwe Broadcasting 
Corporation (ZBC), has wholly aligned itself with ZANU-PF propaganda, rather than seek to 
facilitate national reconciliation. Propaganda experienced throughout ZANU-PF rule has shown 
clear motives towards hegemonic de facto one-party stateism (Dawson & Kelsall, 2013:51–55; 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2011; Ranger, 2004). The 1981 Dumbutshena and 1983 Chihambakwe 
Commission reports remain key in unpacking the truth of the past (Huyse, 2003). Their release at 
the time could have allowed for timeous justice interventions for victims in the early stages of 
Zimbabwe’s transition from colonial Rhodesia. Unfortunately, as Eppel (2013:215) notes, the 
position was that “healing should take place without revealing” particularly in Matabeleland. As 
such victimhood remains hierarchical.  
 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011:1) cites this as “a particularly nationalistic-monologic narrative of the 
nation that enabled its leaders claim to control over the direction of national history; responsibility 
for the birth of the nation; and uncontested right to perpetual power in Zimbabwe”. The 1990s saw 
a decline in this Chimurenga3 narrative and allowed for alternative governance narratives to be 
heard outside the confines of ZANU-PF’s narrow “patriotic history” doctrine (Ranger, 2004:215; 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2011:5-8). With pre-existing tensions between labour politics and those of a 
national agenda, it was easy for the ruling party’s repression tactics to spill over to the opposition 
MDC after ZAPU was subverted into silence (Scarnecchia, 2008, and Sachikonye, 2011, in Moore, 
2012:4; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2011:1, 14-15). Nationalist agendas remain steeped in wartime 
Chimurenga ideologies according to which liberation can only be legitimated through the lens of 
the ruling party. For them, the justification of state-sponsored violence, has been political exploits 
targeted at the “annihilation of enemies and opponents of ZANU-PF” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2011:1, 
see also, Bratton, 2016:55). The control of the national narrative extends to supporting subversions 
of alternative narratives that would otherwise implicate securocrats in human rights violations.  




To illustrate this, victims of the liberation war were beneficiaries of the 1997 War Victims 
Compensation Act. The pay out of Z$1.8billion not only crippled the Zimbabwean economy on 
the infamous Black Friday of 14 November 1997, but was again reflective of the hierarchy of 
victimhood under the Chimurenga narrative. Compensation, as a form of acknowledgement, 
remains politically motivated towards safeguarding elite interests, without disregard for the effects 
on the common person (Dawson & Kelsall, 2013:55; Eppel, 2013:224; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003:32; 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2011). With commitments to civilian victims receiving compensation 
pervasively lacking, despite it being a key victim demand towards acknowledgement of 
perpetrations against them, efforts at engagements in the aftermath of violence seem unlikely 
whilst war credentials are more politically valuable than citizens (Bratton, 2016:220; Thomson & 
Jazdowska, 2012:94). This perpetuates a rotating cycle of perpetration and amnesties, whilst 
keeping conversations around transitional justice as just that. 
 
The tokenisation of truth-seeking and justice, as shown, was a distraction, whilst the solidification 
of clientelist civil-military political settlements occurred within the ruling elite. These were missed 
opportunities in pushing for commitments to truth-telling, restorative justice, and accountability. 
As such, the lack of political will towards SSR in Zimbabwe – discussed in Chapters IV (1) and V 
– has further entrenched securocrats in the governance strategies of the ruling elites and their allies 
(Mutisi, 2011:4; Kriger, 2012). Granting agency to the deceased by collating previously 
documented accounts of perpetration – through medical records, commissions of enquiry, and 
others – “allows them to participate from their graves and contribute to justice, healing and 
reconciliation posthumously” (Zimbabwe Independent, 2019). Likewise, “giving voice to the 
muted and the speechless is part of the transformation of the meanings of the past, involving 
profound redefinitions and rewriting of [an otherwise doctored] history” (Jelin, 2003:86). Political 
tactics that strategically silence the truth, however, continue, and their legacies continue to be felt 
in 2019.  
 
The prospects for non-recurrence which lie in the three dimensions of justice are all based in 
expressions of truth which designates accountability for perpetration and victimhood. Without 
these, only unstable advancements towards social cohesion are possible in the aftermath of 
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violence. In this way, justice and reconciliation are genuine and some level of trust and 
transparency in the process beyond judicial provisions is attained thus raising the potential for 
sustainability. Shelved trauma and denialism embedded in communities promotes citizen apathy, 
resentment for other members of society may result in a resurgence of violence to avenge 
perpetration (Jelin, 2003). None are ideal scenarios. Mani (2008:260) implores transitional 
governments and security forces to work with TJ practitioners before violence becomes cyclical, 
“endemic and impossible to eradicate”. She cites indigenous cultures and practices as having key 
roles in steering affected communities towards peace (Mani, 2008:260). In this regard, it is 
important to re-engage minority cultures in national narratives to aid avenues for effective 
community-based reconstruction that can spill over into broader national cohesion in the aftermath 
of violence. Micro-level settlements within communities remain important to promote community 
healing from the effects of pervasive militarisation. This is necessary to manage social cohesion, 
before widespread SSR can be rolled out. 
 
Considering minorities is useful in understanding the state of social cohesion within a nation as 
the grievances of the most suppressed reveal the various manifestations of violence in society. The 
creation of a national template for the guarantee of non-recurrence of violence by addressing all 
minority grievances at their various intersections is ideal (Collins, 1990; Crenshaw, 1991). This 
allows for more people from different cultures to tell their own truths and nuance the conversation 
around healing to be more inclusive. For instance, in Zimbabwe, forgotten minorities such as the 
Kalanga, Sotho, and many other ethnic groups who inhabit Matabeleland and Midlands, and who 
were arguably the most affected groups during the 1982-1987 Gukurahundi Massacres and other 
injustices as a result need to be granted agency of voice to tell their stories too. Homogenising their 
narratives into ‘the Ndebele story’ continues to be problematic (Eppel, 2013:231-5; Ranger, 
1989:166-7).  
 
It is unfortunate that in 2019, Khanyisela Moyo’s book Postcolonial Transitional Justice: 
Zimbabwe and Beyond lacks nuance in identifying victims and minority groups in the state (Moyo, 
2019b: 136-149). Prioritising one ethnic minority further silences other groups and is an act of 
structural violence in and of itself. The exacerbation of this legacy of silencing by promoting “one 
black minority group” (Moyo, 2019b: 9, see also, 136–149) is careless at best in the reconstruction 
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of exclusive narratives of national healing, whilst silencing and tokenising the memories of victims 
from other ethnic groups. Also, pervasive state denialism in granting legitimacy to some eras of 
violence over others makes it difficult to redress cyclical occurrences of violence in controlled 
narratives – especially if they affect differing ethnic groups at differing times (Eppel, 2013:212–
213). 
 
2. Cyclical articulations of violence in the absence of acknowledgement 
 
The cases to be discussed below do not disqualify other instances of violence such as the farm 
invasions and electoral violence of 2000 as well as other pervasive instances of violence which 
have, and continue to occur, in Zimbabwe. The cases presented reflect ruptural moments in 
Zimbabwe’s society that have spurred on legacies of violence rather than encouraging national 
healing in their aftermath.  
 
2.1 Massacres during emergencies 
 
During the 1983-1990 State of Emergency, a violent crackdown on the supposed 1,500 dissidents 
in the Midlands – a nationally “contested operational zone” between ZANLA and ZIPRA – and 
Matabeleland provinces resulted in the massacre of over 20,000 civilians and the displacement of 
an additional 400,000 by the North Korean-trained ‘Fifth Brigade’ division of the Zimbabwe 
Defence Force (ZDF) who were trained for this purpose (Bratton, 2016:50; CCJP, 1997:30; 
Coltart, 2016:149-55). As Bratton (2016:46) asserts, the attack was because of suspicions over 
Joshua Nkomo’s accommodation of a Vorster-Kaunda détente in 1975 (Bratton, 2016:46). 
Furthermore, the advancement of ‘Super ZAPU’4 posed a serious threat to the ZANU arm of 
government (Meredith, 2002:64, 2014:628-9). Nkomo (1984:154-62) however maintains that the 
meetings held – with Sithole (ZANU), Muzorewa (ZAPU), President Kaunda of Zambia, 
Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith as well as, South African Prime Minister Vorster, amongst 
others – were merely peace talks towards power sharing and military cohesion in the region. He 
also notes that growing divisions and mistrust was mainly within ZANU and ZANLA and threats 
towards ZAPU were a deflection of ZANU’s internal crisis (Nkomo, 1984:158; Bratton, 2016:50). 
During the Gukurahundi violence, “some 20 000 ZAPU supporters surrendered their ZAPU cards 
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and bought ZANU PF cards as an insurance policy” (Coltart, 2016:150). This was further coerced 
consolidation of ZANU power. The violence was comparable to that under Ian Smith’s in 1965 
State of Emergency where citizens in the Midlands and Matabeleland provinces were previously 
subjected to curfews, targeted murders, torture, rape, starvation and other human rights abuses. 
The perpetrators were pardoned in the ‘Gukurahundi Amnesty’ or Clemency Order (1) of 18 April 
1988 under Section 3(1) of the Constitution (Coltart, 2016:149-155; Ndlovu, 2019:144; Ndlovu-
Gatsheni, 2003:32; Scarnecchia, 2011:93).  
 
The Unity Accord of 22 December of 1987 was signed to cease the violence that had ensued from 
1981. Here, ZANU formerly became ZANU-PF and ZAPU became PF-ZAPU. The agreement 
was an opportune time to restore “cordial relations and peace and security” between the Patriotic 
Front liberation parties as well as to the people of the Matabeleland and Midlands provinces 
affected by the violence (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003:31). However, the overarching shortcoming of 
the elite settlement was the lack of reconstruction strategies that would have forged human security 
developments and healthier civil-military relations. As Rupiya (2004:90) observes, this potential 
moment for reconciliation “did not extend to defence and security decision-making, command and 
control realms of the state”. This was indicative of a power play by ZANU-PF elites who 
dominated the political arena to internally safeguard their allies and assets whilst externally 
performing statesmanship.  
 
The legacy of 1987 cemented exclusionary, elitist political agreements in independent Zimbabwe 
which have continued even in the post-Mugabe era (Bratton, 2016:52-9; Norman, 2008:79). The 
elite agreement sought to “conquer the last frontier of resistance to ZANU-PF hegemony” 
(Bratton, 2016:55) rather than heal a tortured nation. This was done by imposing on civilians what 
would become the foundations of “the authoritarian nation building strategies of ZANU-PF” 
(Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003:32). The naming of the Gukurahundi Massacres speaks to the justification 
to eradicate enemies of the state whilst promoting legacies of geo-ethnic and political division in 
Zimbabwe even in 2019 (Rwafa, 2012:318-9). Gukurahundi – meaning “the sweeping away of 
rubbish”, chaff or grain (Meredith, 2002:66) further illuminates its mandate as “a harbinger of 
death” (Rwafa, 2012:315) to those who opposed the elite. Had there been a commitment to redress 
for perpetration in the political settlement of the 1987 Unity Accord, it would have served as a 
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pivotal moment for formulating social cohesion within the state. Instead, pardons were granted to 
dissidents whilst victim’s narratives were dismissed and subverted with further violence. The 1988 
Gukurahundi Amnesty and subsequent amnesties for perpetrators of state sponsored violence 
which continue to be granted, are indicative of how well the culture of impunity has serviced the 
ruling party. Citing Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013, in Tarusarira, 2019:210), “Gukurahundi [must be 
viewed] as a leitmotif of ZANU–PF”. Breaking this cycle will be difficult (Bratton, 2016:52-9; 
CCJP, 1997; Coltart, 2016:107; Crane et al., 2008:5; Eppel, 2013:213-4). 
 
Reflecting on the Unity Accord, Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2003: 31–33) notes certain general conditions 
for post-conflict settlements, which are applicable in an analysis of the accord, with a view to 
identifying its missed opportunities for achieving healthy civil-military relations, social cohesion, 
peace, and security in Zimbabwe. First, political prospects, rather than those for civilian and socio-
economic rebuilding, were prioritised. Consequently, the power-sharing agreement was elitist and 
had no provisions for compensation or redress for victims of perpetration. Second, the post-conflict 
settlement failed to regenerate human capacity, by including capacity-building initiatives, for 
genuine integration in the affected areas. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2003: 32) further highlights this as a 
missed opportunity for psychological rebuilding in traumatised communities. The third aspect 
relates to judicial independence – i.e. the judiciary’s ability to administer retributive justice to all 
identified perpetrators, without fear or favour. Ndlovu-Gatsheni notes that in Zimbabwe, courts 
are denied a fundamental peacebuilding role due to elite interference and manipulation of the law 
concerning clemencies as articulated in Chapter II (1.1). Lastly, he notes the pivotal role of 
economic rebuilding where people have lost jobs and homes during periods of conflict. A legacy 
of misrepresentative post-conflict settlements, parallel to that of silences, violence, and impunities 
within the ruling elites, was ingrained into Zimbabwe’s political culture when the Unity Accord 
failed to deliver the above (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003: 32). 
 
2.2 Removal of the ‘dirt’ (again)  
 
The closing of the political space to alternative voices against the ZANU-PF narrative was again 
detrimental, in 2005, with the start of Operation Murambatsvina. Following increased anti-
corruption protests, the government sought to appease urban voters struggling with rising 
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unemployment and inflation5, by allowing the relaxing of legislation for informal trading. The 
opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), however, still won landslide victories in 
urban areas (Bratton & Masunungure, 2006:35–36; Mlambo, 2008:10). This prompted the 
government to sanction “Operation Murambatsvina” (trans. Remove the Dirt) – language 
reminiscent of the Gukurahundi massacres – on 24 May 2005. There was a crackdown on informal 
spaces in Harare with 30,000 traders arrested or detained and “hundreds of thousands of shanty 
dwellers” evicted within the first two weeks by the City of Harare Commission (Bratton & 
Masunungure, 2006:24-8). Initial estimates showed that 70% of residents in 26 high-density wards 
in Greater Harare lost both shelter and sources of income (Action Aid, 2005, in Bratton & 
Masunungure, 2006:28). Ordinary Zimbabweans dubbed the clampdown “Operation 
Murambavanhu” (trans. Operation Anti-People), with 700,000 people losing their homes and six 
losing their lives at the time of investigation. However, the official government translation was 
‘Operation Restore Order’ to legitimise the arbitrarily violent intervention in the area. The 
contradiction in discernments was clear (Bratton & Masunungure, 2006:21–23; HRW, 2008:11; 
Tibaijuka, 2005:7, 62). With the MDC calling for a truth and reconciliation commission, the 
government issued blanket amnesties for perpetrators (Eppel, 2013:226-227; Thomson & 
Jazdowska, 2012:81-83). 
 
Operation Murambatsvina, coupled with dismissals of the MDC’s call for a truth and reconciliation 
commission in 2006, further tilted civil-military relations towards promoting the interests of 
securocrats and away from those of citizens (Eppel, 2013:226-227; MDC, 2006; Thomson & 
Jazdowska, 2012:81–88). Pervasive violence and repression during election periods remain 
concerning. Though Bratton (2016:235) reminds us that ZANU-PF has never respected electoral 
democracy and has used violence to either intimidate voters or to provide a deterrent to the 
manipulation of voting outcomes, economic and human capacity-rebuilding remain absent from 
its agenda in the aftermath of such violence (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003:32). As Rupiya (2005:118) 
explains, militarised operations are immune from outside interference and complete their tasks 
swiftly, whilst viewing impediments – including civilian-based ones – as hostile. When the 
operation has been completed, perpetrators are immune from retributive justice. This has been the 
nature of the violence that has shaped gestured TJ efforts in Zimbabwe since 2000 (Bratton, 
2016:82). 
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2.3 ‘Violence Quotidienne’  
 
Thomson and Jazdowska (2012) conducted a pilot study of grassroots narratives of political 
violence and justice in Zimbabwe, with data collected from victims of violence from across the 
country. They found that none of the participants “had gained recompense or a sense of relief from 
seeing their perpetrators account for what they had done. It [remains] common for perpetrators to 
still move around freely and continue to appear in their victims’ lives” (p. 93–94). A lack of 
confidence in traditional judicial processes to deliver justice at an individual level was also noted 
by a woman participant from a village in Masvingo province: 
 
My heart is full of the spirit of revenge and every time I see any of the boys I see blood. I can’t forgive 
them for the part they played in the effort to destroy my life. No level of court judgement can adequately 
redress the destruction and I will never reconcile with the perpetrators. (p. 94) 
 
The authors juxtaposed perceptions of justice against those over amnesties. They cited a survey, 
conducted by the Harare-based Research and Advocacy Unit (RAU), which found that 514 
activists who were victims of violence were aware that amnesties may not lead to justice even 
though they might be “necessary to produc[ing] a lasting political settlement”. Of those 
interviewed, “few were willing to see serious crimes go unpunished” (RAU, 2009, in Thomson & 
Jazdowska, 2012:91). A Freedom House (2009, in Thomson & Jazdowska, 2012:91–92) study 
further showed variances along partisan lines where 66% of MDC supporters favoured punishment 
over amnesty, only 38% of ZANU-PF supporters felt the same way.  
 
As displayed, the calls for redress and justice are clear regardless of the demographic or partisan 
loyalty. Amnesties in this instance must then be viewed as an expression of conceited statehood 
when authority has been challenged (McEvoy & Mallinder, 2012:414, 432; McEvoy, 2007:421-
4). In Zimbabwe, clemencies have been institutionalised and used as scapegoats to confronting 
accountability and the inherent violence present in the country by elites who still hold power. 
Likewise, perpetrators who act on behalf of securocrats need not worry about needing a deterrent 
against proceeding in violence with government assurances behind them (Bratton, 2016:220; 
Goredema, 2004:105; McEvoy & Mallinder, 2012:422-7). Historically, unlike precolonial African 
states, amnesties aided in the European state project of amnesia which was viewed as a 
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precondition for stability and peace in the aftermath of conflict. From a systemic level of analysis, 
the consequences for such institutionalisation is silencing through commanded forgetfulness and 
legal amnesia resulting in a denial of justice (Ricœur, 2003:353, in McEvoy & Mallinder, 
2012:414).  
 
2.4 The Mnangagwa Era 
 
In the aftermath of the 2018 election, the MDC Alliance claimed to have won the presidential vote. 
The Supreme Court of Zimbabwe however found that the opposition party failed “to prove this in 
its electoral petition and the related court hearings, failing to produce sufficient documentation of 
discrepancies to back up its claims” (Beardsworth et al., 2019:592). This after the Zimbabwe 
Electoral Commission (ZEC) revised down the margin in which President Mnangagwa won the 
election from 50.8% to 50.67%. Further doubts of judicial impartiality arose when a civil society 
call centre, We the People of Zimbabwe (2018, in Beardsworth et al., 2019:591-2), “received 
thousands of messages from across the country [reporting] a remarkably high number of cases in 
which voters were ordered to ask for assistance to vote from a known ZANU-PF member or 
supporter”. The allegations were disregarded by government officials and President Mnangagwa 
was sworn in on 26 August 2018. 
 
There can be no justice in any form whilst systemic silences and denialisms of collusion prevail. 
Despite the removal of Mugabe from office, in November 2017, “the disposal of the systemic 
carcass was going to be a larger task than had been originally conceived” (Ndlovu, 2018). The 
post-electoral violence that ensued on 1 August 2018 saw the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA)’s 
militarised response kill six civilians and seriously injure fourteen others in Harare’s central 
business district in full view of international media (Beardsworth et al., 2019:583; Ndlovu, 2018). 
This was in response to protests “following allegations that the presidential election result was 
being rigged in favour of ZANU-PF” (Beardsworth et al., 2019:583). Writing on this at the time, 
I reflected on the legal and militarised responses of the Mnangagwa regime in the days that 
followed as being reminiscent of the Mugabe era in its efforts to safeguard its authority: 
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In response to [the events of 1 August 2018], the 2002 Protection of Order and Security Act (POSA), 
which further limited citizen freedoms, was immediately invoked. Adding to this, the harassment of 
international media by riot police on 3 August while trying to cover the MDC Alliance’s Press 
Conference highlighted tensions in the aftermath of the announcement of the presidential 
result. Moreover, on the evening of 3 August, reports emerged of continued army intimidation in high-
density suburbs such as Chitungwiza and Kuwadzana. (Ndlovu, 2018) 
 
Prior to the elections, Bratton and Masunungure (2018), in an analysis of Afrobarometer data, 
found that: 
 
In early May, a slim majority (51%) said they personally feared becoming a victim of electoral 
intimidation or violence; by early July, a large minority (43%) expressed this concern, an 8-percentage-
point drop. This positive shift in the public mood occurred even in the face of a bomb blast at a ZANU-
PF election rally at White City Stadium in Bulawayo on June 23. It is reinforced by a growing majority 
(68%) who thought the current government was performing well at “preventing electoral violence” (up 
5 points from 63% in May). (p. 12) 
 
Despite this though, Zimbabweans knew the system with which they were dealing with as over 
40% raised concerns over the eruption of violence as they feared armed forces would not respect 
the citizen’s choice (Bratton & Masunungure, 2018a:2). This was with good reason given the 
president’s legacy. Mnangagwa had promised human rights and economic reforms, on 20 
December 2017, whilst delivering his first State of the Nation Address as president. Mnangagwa 
had referred to endemic state-sponsored violence, such as the farm invasions of 2000, as an 
“albatross around the government’s neck” (Sithole-Matarise, 2017). Furthermore, he had promised 
“zero tolerance” to corruption (Sithole-Matarise, 2017). Mnangagwa – a key architect of the 1982-
1987 Gukurahundi Massacres, as well as a plethora of violations in the Mugabe era, and Mugabe’s 
successor after the coup in 2017 – was however stuck between a rock and a hard place as he had 
to defend his reformist agenda against the actions of his government from 2018 onwards (Bratton, 
2016:54; Coltart, 2016:136-156; Matyszak, 2019; Sithole-Matarise, 2017).  
 
History repeated itself in when President Mnangagwa called for a commission of inquiry to 
investigate the deployment of armed military personnel on civilians in the wake of events in 
August 2018. Matyszak (2019), however, notes that “key findings of the Motlanthe Commission 
were based on patently fabricated evidence”. A year on in 2019, no further government action nor 
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national consultations on possibilities on rectificatory justice following the events had occurred 
(Matyszak, 2019). The secrecy and denialism around accountability by both domestic and regional 
elites reveals a protectionism that validates clientelist agreements over citizens’ lives. This ensures 
legitimacy within governing elites rather than within the confines of a social contract. In this, 
advancements in governance is seen solely through the legitimacy, effectiveness and security of 
the elite (Eppel, 2013; Kriger, 2012).  
 
The current state of affairs remains characterised by “an uneasy political peace” both within the 
ruling elite and with the ever-declining economic situation (Thomas-Greenfield & Wharton, 
2019:15). This has been characterised by pillaged foreign currency reserves; the devaluation of 
currency because of the introduction of a pseudo-currency, in 2016; inflation; and accumulating 
national debt. On 8 January 2019, public servants declared incapacitation and gave notice to strike 
(Alexander & McGregor, 2013; Amnesty International, 2019:5–6; Cotterill, 2019; Dawson & 
Kelsall, 2013:53; Moore, 2012). Following this, on 12 January 2019, President Mnangagwa 
announced a fuel hike from “$1.30 per litre to $3.11 per litre, an increase of more than 200%” 
(Raftopoulos, 2019: 12). The president then left for the World Economic Forum in Davos on 13 
January 2019 (Amnesty International, 2019:8). The Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions 
(ZCTU) then called for a nationwide strike on 14–16 January 2019.  
 
During 14 and 15 January 2019, looting took place across the country. Raftopoulos (2019:21) 
highlights that “notable in almost all accounts of the looting, [was] the lack of state response”, 
which raises suspicions of militia involvement. The blame, though, is likely to be placed onto 
supposed “third forces” (Raftopoulos, 2019:13–21). In addition, widespread rape, abductions, 
detentions of minors, indiscriminate restrictions on public assembly, unlawful killings and 
beatings, amongst other violations, ensued (Amnesty International, 2019; Raftopoulos, 2019). The 
government’s attempts at “controlling” dissent included an “unprecedented” total internet 
shutdown for the duration of the protests. This ended when the High Court ruled the shutdown 
unlawful on 21 January 2019 (Beardsworth et al., 2019:594; The Guardian, 2019). Closed off from 
the world, Zimbabweans endured a traumatic crackdown that saw 12 people (officially) killed by 
security forces and over 600 arrests made in connection to the violence (Amnesty International, 
2019: 9). Accountability for these violations, again, remains open to interpretation. 
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Writing about the events of January 2019, Beardsworth et al. (2019) assert: 
 
violence deployed by the administration in response to the protests and roadblocks was considerably 
more widespread and severe than in August [2018] and extended to the beating and detention of a wide 
range of civil society and opposition figures including many who were not responsible. (p. 593–594) 
 
The events of August 2018 and January 2019 raise two questions. First, was the president always 
insincere in his expressions of support for economic reconstruction, re-engagement with citizens, 
and political reform? Second, has the president allowed hardliners – particularly General 
Constantine Chiwenga – to bypass him and inflict violence against his command? (Beardsworth 
et al., 2019:594; Matyszak, 2019).  
 
President Mnangagwa’s denial of widespread rape by army personnel during the internet shutdown 
indicts him for violations tantamount to proclamations of warfare6 on Zimbabweans. This is 
buttressed in denying that he issued commands to violence in August 2018 onwards. Under his 
authority as the president, and commander in chief of the ZDF, in Section 100 (2a) of the 
Constitution of Zimbabwe, Amendment (No. 20) Act, 2013, he has unwarranted designation to 
deploy the military (Ayiera, 2010:8; Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2013; Raftopolous, 2019:4-6). 
Beliefs in Mnangagwa’s insincerity are further justified by the abduction and torture of civil 
society activists, opposition members, and unionists such as medical practitioner Peter 
Magombeyi. Magombeyi was later found in 40 km out of Harare on the evening of 19 September 
2019 being abducted and tortured for demanding an increase in wages for doctors across the 
country. The government’s continued claim of ignorance in the case is reflective of the regularity 
of such violent tactics. Despite rumoured tensions within the securocrat elite in 2019, a system of 
torture and anarchy remains (Mail & Guardian, 2019; Matyszak, 2019; Mokoena, 2019; Reuters, 
2019).  
To reiterate, these tactics are however not new. As Minister of State for National Security in 1983, 
Mnangagwa had declared “woe unto those who will choose the path of collaboration with 
dissidents for we will surely shorten their stay on earth” (The Chronicle, 1983 in Coltart, 
2016:134). Where “dissidents” are viewed as those who challenge or force accountability on the 
ruling party and periphery elites; Mnangagwa has remained consistent to tactics deployed from 
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1982-1987. Repression in 2019 still involves extrajudicial murders, rapes, detentions, 
disappearances and other forms of state-sanctioned organised violence and torture clear in the 
governing strategy of his regime (Amnesty International, 2019).  
3. Military and Political Power: The Securocrat Legacy 
 
In 1977, the Joint Operations Command (JOC) was established by the Rhodesian government with 
the mandate of overseeing military activity within the state (Bratton, 2016:192). As a legacy of 
this, the JOC controlled “the growth and development of the opposition” post-independence 
(Matekere & El Moghazy, 2015:269). According to Bratton (2016): 
 
the JOC is a semiformal, nonstatutory body at the apex of the security establishment that represents the 
joint chiefs of staff. Its membership is composed of the top commanders of the ZDF, AFZ, CIO, ZRP 
and ZPS. Acting as a sort of war cabinet, the JOC meets weekly to develop strategic responses to 
national security crises and to recommend action plans to the president. The ministers of defense and 
state security, and sometimes the chair of the ZNLWVA, also attend regular JOC meetings. (p. 200)  
 
Considering growing opposition in 2000, re-organisation within securitised networks was crucial 
to working out a militarised plan “to ensure ZANU-PF’s military survival during and after national 
elections” (Chitiyo, 2009:8). As the “real managers of Zimbabwean politics”, the military elite and 
their networks became the ruling class of Zimbabwe and showed open allegiance to ZANU-PF 
(Chitiyo, 2009:8; Matekere & El Moghazy, 2015:270; Tendi, 2013:841). Militarisation did not 
bestow power on military elites, as the party does not have command of the gun. Rather, the 
opposite is true (Tendi, 2013:836, 841). Quoting Emmerson Mnangagwa, then Minister of State 
in the Prime Minister’s Office, in 1981, Tendi (2013) illustrates the relationship between the 
military and ZANU-PF: 
 
The agreement under which we got our independence [in 1980] is such that we ceased to propagate the 
ideology of ZANU in the army. But our army is taught to support the policies of the existing 
government, which is a ZANU government. Now the policies of the government are the policies of 
ZANU. (p. 836) 
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The patron-client relations formed by legacies of the liberation struggle alliances between the 
ZANU-PF party and the military allowed for the conflation of priorities of the state with those of 
elite accumulation and benefit. Through the GNU in 2009, the JOC was informalised and the name 
disbanded. Despite this, military elites have continued to meet in private with ZANU-PF members 
and run a “parallel government” within the security community that undermines progressive 
governance (Raftopolous, 2013b:20). Perceived progress is therefore thwarted by advances that 
prioritise securocrat accumulation of state rents (Chitiyo, 2009:9; Kriger, 2012:12; Moore, 2012:6; 
Rupiya, 2003; Zimbabwe Institute, 2008). 
 
Though militarised politicisation of the civil space remains concerning in 2019, the ability to 
command such loyalty across regimes is a phenomenon that can be explained through internal elite 
structures. The power source of ZANU-PF securocrats lies in the chain of military command, 
where the commander-in-chief is the superior power, and in the hierarchy of ZANU-PF members 
and former ZANLA guerrillas. It is this chain of command that allowed Mugabe to gain respect 
from military elites (Tendi, 2013:837). The retirement of the late General Solomon Mujuru as 
commander of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) in 1992, the exiting of Edgar Tekere and 
Enos Nkala from ZANU-PF in 1988 and 1989 respectively, as well as the death of Maurice 
Nyagumbo in 1989, left Robert Mugabe as the prominent commanding figure within the party 
amongst “the emerging generation of service chiefs” (Tendi, 2013:841). Mugabe’s seniority lasted 
until the end of his tenure as the President of Zimbabwe in 2017. In the post-Mugabe era, though 
Emmerson Mnangagwa does not rank as highly in liberation credentials as Mugabe did, his roles 
as the head of state and government and the commander-in-chief of the ZDF accord him the same 
power, patronage, and access as his predecessor. Mugabe-style militarisation processes under 
Mnangagwa have been seen where military personnel – such as General Sibusiso Moyo, General 
Constantine Chiwenga, and General Philip Valerio Sibanda – were formerly retired out of service 
to become the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Vice President, and the Commander of the ZDF 
respectively (Moore, 2018c:11–12; Tendi, 2013:837–841).  
 
Whilst examining militarisation, Mugabe’s unique intellectual and strategic prowess in navigating 
the asymmetric dynamic within patron-client relations must be noted. He could tactfully “play 
rivals and threats one against the other” and manipulate his political legitimacy (Doran, 2017:644). 
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Though his enigmatic, non-reactionary persona often gained him respect with the patron-client 
elite that surrounded him, his “insatiable greed and gluttony” for power and control fuelled 
neopatrimonialism in Zimbabwe (Mkandawire, 2015:572; Norman, 2008). Ndlovu-Gatsheni’s 
(2015) notion of “Mugabeism” explains that the persona of Mugabe was synonymous with the 
institutions that governed Zimbabwe as well as their systemic legacies. His era may have ended 
but the system set up by Mugabeism has not. Moore (2018b) notes: 
 
it is harder to imagine that the incumbent president, Emmerson [Dambudzo] Mnangagwa, will be able 
to balance Zimbabwe’s many mutually antagonistic forces for long beyond Mugabe. Indeed, it was 
Mugabe’s own attempts to use these forces to his advantage that led to his downfall – eventually. (p. 
265) 
 
The institutionalisation of systemic Mugabeism is, thus, not sustainable for more than a generation 
without the person that the system mirrored at the helm of power (Moore, 2018b; Ndlovu-
Gatsheni, 2015). Despite having worked closely with Mugabe for over four decades, Mnangagwa 
must redefine his power politics either by descending further into the established system and 
revealing new avenues for neopatrimonialism or by working to reorientate it to suit his interests. 
Vis-à-vis his relationship with the military, as it stood in 2019, Beardsworth et al. (2019) note: 
 
 while the army has at times operated independently from civilian authorities, Mnangagwa has a 
complex relationship with the institution that allows him considerable leverage. It is now clear, for 
example, that despite initial rumours to the contrary, it was the president himself who ordered soldiers 
on to the streets of Harare in 2018 and not army leaders operating under their own steam. This suggests 
that Mnangagwa is more powerful than he is sometimes depicted as being by those who see him as a 
frustrated reformer trapped in a restrictive system. (p. 595) 
 
This analysis suggests that Mnangagwa remains committed to further entrenching the politics of 
patronage for the benefit of the ruling elite – i.e. to the status quo. Cheeseman and Tendi (2010, in 
Kriger, 2012:1) refer to this tenet of ZANU-PF securocrats and their allies as the “politics of 
continuity”. People perpetuate these systems. Therefore, the networks that maintain executive 
power are important to examine.  
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3.1 Elites and Civil-Military Relations 
 
Civil-military relations refers to the established and interdependent relationship between state 
security agents and their supportive institutions in a given society (Ebo, 2005:2, in Matekere & El 
Moghazy, 2015:250; Huntington & Goodpaster, 1977:31, in Rupiya, 2003:252–253). The relations 
themselves are to be understood through the broad “professional, political, social and economic” 
roles of the military (Moyo, 2015:162). Within this understanding, there remains objective and 
subjective control by the military and its supporting institutions. Where objective control is 
highlighted, there is a separation of powers between military and civilian institutions. In 
Zimbabwe, where subjective control is concerned, “patronage-based military control is a norm” 
and the “distinction between the government and the army has been lost” (Moyo, 2015: 163). 
Moyo (2015: 164) highlights that under Zimbabwean law, military personnel cannot participate in 
politics other than to exercise their democratic right to vote. The history and reality of elite survival 
and sources of power has, however, “firmly entrenched [the] executive control of the military” in 
the political sphere (Moyo, 2015: 164). Buttressing this, Rupiya (2003:251–252) argues that the 
political settlements that formed Zimbabwe’s politico-military institutions were highly 
competitive between ZANU and ZAPU nationalists. Reliance on military strength in nationalist 
contestations for dominance has been evident in political, economic, and military spaces, with each 
nationalist grouping having “created [its] own military wing and … [used] this arm to advance 
political objectives” (Rupiya, 2003:252). This liberation movement model of civil-military 
relations, which highlights the asymmetric politics of domination, has remained a means of 
understanding societal problems within a revolutionary war context for the ruling elite. This is 
recognisable through the dismantling of ZAPU – a then fellow militarised elite – as a viable 
contender with securitised power (Moyo, 2015:161; Rupiya, 2003:252). 
 
Ideally, stability is realised when dominance allays the apprehensions of the dominated (Di John 
& Putzel, 2009:4, 45; Rupiya, 2003:252). Stability can be measured by political cultures, through 
its exercise in varying degrees through democratic processes; surveillance; social protections; 
conflict resolution processes; decentralisation; as well as demilitarisation of administrative power 
amongst bargaining elites (Huntington & Goodpaster, 1977:31, in Rupiya, 2003:252–253). Khan 
(2010:57), however, cautions that consensus amongst bargaining elites is rare. As such, internal 
and external clashes amongst political actors arise when “the triad [of] the security sector, 
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government and other sectors of society” (Rupiya, 2003:252) compete within the state against 
various ideologies.  
 
Political settlements are tools for elites to reshape institutions in their own interests (Parks & Cole, 
2010:6). Despite the need to relinquish some control to reach a settlement, ZANU-PF has 
persistently retained control (Di John & Putzel, 2009:45; Diamond, 1999:163; Walter, 1999:137). 
Albeit assumed mutual understandings of the conditions of the independence settlement with 
ZANU by ZAPU; neither ZANU nor ZAPU felt sure of security through power in 1979 at 
Lancaster House. The paradox lay in a failed balance of the interests of bargaining elites towards 
relinquishing power to form a new administrative corps whilst retaining a semblance of security 
and trust for each other (Nkomo, 1984; Coltart, 2016).  
 
Despite the dissolution of the JOC in 2008, the JOC remains subservient to ZANU-PF under the 
control of the president as the head of ZANU-PF. This whilst technocrat and civilian led efforts to 
transition Zimbabwe out of a militarised state continue to face reproach (Chitiyo, 2009:8-9; ICG, 
2010:4; Mutisi, 2011; Tendi, 2013:836). Echoing Rupiya’s (2003) inference that the ruling ZANU-
PF elite continues to inflict militarised solutions on civic socio-political and economic issues, 
Dendere (2018: 378) observes that military interference in Zimbabwe has never been “motivated 
by the need to find solutions to the twin economic and political crisis”.  Likewise, reflexive analysis 
on ‘Operation Restore Legacy’ in 2019 reveals that the securocrats that aided the ascension of the 
Mnangagwa regime have been successful in their operational mandate to interfere in the politics 
to safeguard their interests (Moore, 2018a; Mudau & Mangani, 2018:179; Ndlovu, 2018; Tendi, 
2020:40). This is further testament to the engrained nature of militarisation within the Zimbabwean 
state. Even in 2019, the state of Zimbabwean civil-military relations is reflective of the 
omnipresent militarised operations in the country (Tendi, 2020). Political settlements that were 
perceived as moments of transition out of oppressive regimes in Zimbabwe over three decades 
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4. Denial and Trauma  
 
The removal of Mugabe as the face of tyranny was not the overhauling of the system (Cameron, 
2017; Thomas-Greenfield & Wharton, 2019:8-13). Pervasive cultures of denialism at all levels of 
societal engagement in Zimbabwe make it difficult to extrapolate truth and subsequent justice. 
Whether literal, interpretive or implicatory, denial takes shape in either “moral indifference” or the 
“denial of knowledge” (Cohen, 2001:77; Cohen, 1996:522). Also, within these denialisms, silence 
may be perceived as “passivity, loyalty or pragmatism” (Lawther, 2013, in Tarusarira, 2019:221). 
Hamm (2002) defines denialism: 
 
as an unconscious defense mechanism for coping with guilt, anxiety and other disturbing emotions 
aroused by reality. The psyche blocks off information that is literally unthinkable or unbearable. The 
unconscious sets up a barrier which prevents the thought from reaching conscious knowledge. 
Information and memories slip into an inaccessible region of the mind. (p. 178) 
 
In the first instance, the denial for atrocities by the accused as they did not commit the offence. 
This is the literal aspect of denial. Second, there may be interpretive denialism of known truths 
through intentional duplicity by perpetrators (Cohen, 1996:522). Such denialism manifests in 
deceit, concealment or even lying to oneself or one’s administration. Such interpretive denials to 
which Cohen (1996:522) refers are key to the sustenance of patron-client relations in securing their 
accumulative benefits. Here, ignorance is also used to silence moral responsibilities towards truth-
seeking and accountability towards non-resurgence of violence (Cohen, 2001). Third, implicatory 
denial is then when perpetration is supposedly justified (Cohen, 1996:522). Here, counter-
narratives that go against projected narratives by elites categorise whistle-blowers and anti-
patronage activists as traitors (Cohen, 1996:535). In this, Hirschman (1970:30–4) and Lawther 
(2013:169, in Tarusarira, 2019:221) unpack this form of denial as “unconscious loyalism” and 
silence through “loyalty” of insider actors to a system respectively. 
 
Silence, as a form of denial, occurs at both state and individual levels in a bid to subconsciously 
compartmentalise traumatic events through granting amnesties to perpetrators and the denial of 
justice to victims. In Zimbabwe, silence manifesting through impunities remains particularly 
problematic for those who fall outside privileged protections of the ruling elite. This remains as a 
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major obstacle for TJ (Amnesty International, 2002; Bratton, 2016; CCJP, 1997; Coltart, 2016; 
Moore, 1991). The form of denial where the truth is unknown in the public realm is particularly 
dangerous as broader societal indifference cement hatred between belligerents and foster 
asymmetric power politics. This form of denial can be interpreted as silence through passivity 
where knowledge exists in the absence of reaction (Lawther, 2013:169, in Tarusarira, 2019:221). 
In Zimbabwe, this is particularly true where citizens suffer perpetration and the hands of periphery 
state security networks and prospects for justice, public acknowledgement and accountability are 
unlikely. Likewise buttressed by instances when neighbouring countries and communities are 
captured by the dictates of ideological loyalties and power politics that necessitate their own 
legitimacy. This was exemplified by the porous South African mediation of the GPA (Cohen, 
2001; Hirsch, 2008:106; Mutisi, 2011:4). 
 
At the individual level, silences manifest in varying memories of traumatic events retained 
interpretive denials of communal narratives and memories of historical perpetration. Pickering and 
Keightley (2009:238) note that trauma, as a fluid concept, references “the severe difficulty of 
coming to terms with a shocking or painful event or an enduring series of such events in an 
individual’s experience, along with the consequences of this in someone’s subsequent life”. Both 
historical and structural trauma exist, and TJ efforts must tackle both, as well as the complexities 
at their various intersections. Historical trauma as the primary instance of violation is experienced 
by individuals and communities but is always internalised individually (LaCapra, 1999:721-2). 
Given this, some people may choose to practice pragmatic silence as “a deliberate choice 
to…truncate conflict over the meaning or justification of past violence” (Lawther, 2013, in 
Tarusarira, 2019:221). The structural element of historicised trauma is the subsequent socialisation 
of this into society (LaCapra, 1999:725). The existence of various of narratives of perpetration are 
often ‘mythicised’ a coping mechanism for humanity in the aftermath of violent clashes where 
national cultures and narratives of truth and acknowledgement absent. This unfortunately keeps 
prospects of further perpetration alive through reliving past violations thus inducing fear (LaCapra, 
1999:721-7; Ndlovu, 2019). This psychoanalytical level of analysis is important to note in seeking 
to understand civilian apathy and the effects of endemic trauma in the light of endemic societal 
violence – both physical and systemic – in Zimbabwe. Denialism or deliberate amnesia towards 
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traumatic events remains transferrable as political cultures allow (Cohen, 1996, 2001; LaCapra, 
1999; Ndlovu, 2019:215).  
 
Moyo (2019b:24) notes that transitional justice breeds accountability and “[a]ccountability … 
deters the new regime from complacently violating human rights norms”. Contrary to Moyo’s 
assertion, known evidence of perpetration and prospects of accountability have proven to not deter 
new regimes in Zimbabwe. In fact, President Mnangagwa himself remains accountable to much – 
from the Gukurahundi massacres to his involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
and Marange diamond trade routes which shall be addressed in Chapters IV (1.1) and (1.2) – yet 
continues to answer to very little (Bratton, 2016:54; Chitiyo, 2009; Coltart, 2016:136-56; Dawson 
& Kelsall, 2013:58; Kriger, 2012:19-23). Citizens then self-preserve by repressing such memories 
to avoid violent state-sponsored backlash (Ndlovu, 2019:228-32; Tarusrira, 2019:221). This makes 
healing intervention processes difficult, as narratives are often reimagined and some perpetrators 
omitted.  
 
There are however the dangers in repressing memory. Trauma manifested in various degrees of 
mental illness that may affect how facts of violation are remembered (Pickering & Keightley, 
2009:238). This is the state of victims of the Zimbabwean state’s violations, who have not been 
afforded justice after perpetration. Generational legacies of politicised denial are not enough to 
mask societal knowledge of violent occurrences in Zimbabwe as tangible evidence of perpetration 
will always exist. Writing on Gukurahundi, Ndlovu (2019) reminds us that:  
 
[d]espite state denial the presence of witnesses, mass graves, the resurgence of written reports since the late 
1990s, and medical reports archived from the 1980s, have all provided much needed evidence of [endemic 
violent occurrences]. (p. 147) 
 
Due to the pervasive and cyclical nature of violence in Zimbabwe, many silenced perpetrations are 
unpacked decades after the act. TJ efforts that attempt to redress perpetration retrospectively face 
two issues. First, there are statutes of limitation for retribution under the domestic criminal justice 
system in Zimbabwe. This inhibits trail in domestic courts after a certain period. Thus, justice 
evades many cases, as many people – especially in rural areas – remain unaware of the timeframes, 
locations, and processes vis-à-vis the reporting of violations. Some, even with the information, do 
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not feel safe enough to approach the court run by the government which violated them, nor to go 
to their village chiefs, who are often passive in ZANU-PF rural mobilisation initiatives (Alexander 
& McGregor, 2013:756; Kriger, 2012:18). Second, the historical facts surrounding a traumatic 
event may be forgotten or distorted over a prolonged period (Jelin, 2003:56, 87; LaCapra, 2001:1, 
and Jelin, 2003:48, in Ndlovu, 2019:130).  
 
Given state denialisms and subversion of voice to victims and survivors, the burden of proof 
continues to rest on the perpetrated unless their incident(s) have been documented and stored 
outside state institutions. This is particularly difficult when the government is the same ruthless 
abuser of institutions that are meant to develop a country (Mani, 2008 in Eppel 2013:221). As this 
burden is costly, reawakening of past traumas and oft life-threatening given the current state of the 
nation, many of those perpetrated who would have benefitted from previous state-funded projects 
and national dialogues are excluded from the healing process. This is true especially when the 
claimant for justice belongs to the next generation (Eppel, 2013:224-6; Hirsch, 2008).  
 
The psychological merits of transitional justice processes are critical in societies such as Zimbabwe 
where sites of perpetration remain unaddressed and perpetrators continue to control governance 
narratives. Much needed recognition of perpetration and redress must still occur. As Tarusarira 
(2019:223) asserts, “[s]ilence and denial are…direct affronts to knowledge and 
acknowledgement”. The latter remain important for the consolidation of a national metanarrative 
















1. Framing Militarisation 
 
Elite hesitance to allow for national healing efforts are problematically entrenched in the need to 
preserve securocrats and their allies in government and industry. Accountability through 
transparency is therefore not an option (Bratton, 2016:221, 227-8; Eppel, 2013:212-4; Khan, 2005; 
Magure, 2012; Moore, 2012). Securocrats remain vested in keeping ZANU-PF in power to 
maintain the legacies of patron-client relations to this end (Alexander & McGregor, 2013:758; 
Chitiyo, 2009:7; Kriger, 2003:198; Kriger, 2012:13; Magaisa, 2019a; Sachikonye, 2011:22-3). 
This chapter examines the processes and legacies of access and accumulation which have resulted 
in a rejected consociational governance that would bargain for better power-sharing, democracy, 
and deterrence of violence (Andeweg, 2000; Brown & Ní Aoláin, 2014:127–128). Though this 
type of governance is, generally speaking, preferred in transitioning from conflict and preventing 
a resurgence of grievances that might lead to violence, the power politics of the civil-military elite 
in Zimbabwe have favoured unipolar configurations. Inevitably, these top-down system-wide 
approaches have resulted in a lack of reform of state institutions towards effectiveness – more so, 
in an unwillingness to embark on transformative efforts (Kelsall, 2016, 2018; Sithole, 1988). 
Brown and Ní Aoláin (2014:128) note that this is representative of the type of “political power that 
enables client[e]lism, resilience and the intensification of traditional identities and militant 
expressionism”, as it enables a lack of reform and transformation within critical state institutions.  
 
The legacy of the liberation struggle forms the product of the current state, characterised by patron-
client relations through its institutions and alliances. The state and its aligned networks have 
consistently prioritised these alliances to preserve the ruling elite. A defining result has been the 
militarisation of the state. The 1982–1987 Gukurahundi massacres serve as an early indication of 
the extent to which the post-independence state, run by the liberation struggle elite, was to engage 
with securitisation as a form of political preservation and opposition elimination (Coltart, 2016; 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2003). As a characteristic of the state, “Zimbabwe’s politics was militarised, 
and military coercion became the currency of politics” (Chitiyo & Rupiya, 2005:359). According 
to Alexander (2013:811), the post-1997 period is a legitimisation of the widespread militarisation. 
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The subsequent escalation of violence in the post-2000 period – cited in the work of scholars such 
as Rupiya and Chitiyo (2005), Eppel (2013), Dawson & Kelsall (2013:58), and Tendi (2013, 2016) 
– is also testament to this.  
 
Alexander (2013:811–3) identifies four key processes that led to the militarisation of Zimbabwean 
society that will form the foundations of the discussion in this chapter. First, she notes that 
militarisation “encompassed the decisive intervention of the military qua military and as part of 
the state in electoral politics” (Alexander, 2013:811–2). According to Alexander (2013:811–2), 
this was demonstrated most intensely in the 2008 electoral period. From 2004 onwards, President 
Mugabe made appointments from the security community to run electoral institutions such as the 
ZEC and the Delimitation Commission. Notable in this regard was the appointment of Retired 
Major General George Chiweshe – a former Judge Advocate in the ZNA and High Court Judge – 
as Chair of the ZEC. The results, as seen in 2008, included a discredited election outcome that 
resulted in widespread post-electoral violence (Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 2011:9). The 
validation of these appointments was supported by processes that preceded it, as seen in the 
eventual saturation of “serving and retired military officers [in] state posts” (Tendi, 2013:841). 
This initial process is what Tendi (2013:841) defines as militarisation, but is only a part of the 
overall process according to Alexander (2013:811–3).  
 
If not institutionalised, aspirations towards access to power become personalised (van de Welle, 
2001:117). The personalisation of power is seen through elite clientelism which is practiced by the 
head of government who has “personal access to resources” (Tendi, 2013:841). The performance 
of militarism for self-preservation is a form of clientelism, as patrons give patronage, tributes and 
prebends to appease clients. Where prebendalism is concerned, clients believe they are entitled to 
make “personal use of state resources” often as perceived payment for loyalty or “sacrifices during 
the liberation war” (Tendi, 2013:841, see also, Khan, 2005:11). The incentive to remain loyal 
comes from benefits accorded to clients through access to privileged state positions and resources 
(Tendi, 2013:841). Patron-client relations in Zimbabwe have allowed for an endemic culture of 
prebendalism – as an extension of patronage that is predisposed to entitlement – to fester amongst 
all with access to disrupting ZANU-PF legitimacy within and beyond militarised allegiances 
(Behuria et al., 2017:512; Khan, 2010:64–5; Tendi, 2013:841-2; van de Welle, 2001:51-3). 
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Neopatrimonialism has been at the core of Zimbabwe’s political economics for over three decades. 
This characterises the second aspect of Alexander’s (2013) processes of militarisation as: 
 
the entrance of military men (former and serving, in and outside the state and party) into lucrative 
networks of accumulation and patronage, ranging from the award of government contracts and tenders 
to businesses owned by military and party leaders to more direct control of production and trade. These 
practices have a long history rooted in the 1970s, but the 1997 military intervention in the DRC marked 
a new watershed, while the involvement of the security forces in Zimbabwe’s massive diamond fields 
from 2006 “cemented” their “role as the dominant class in Zimbabwe’s business community. (p. 812)  
 
Over the years, accumulation has taken many forms however securocrats remain as constant 
beneficiaries. The Willowgate Scandal of 1989 was the first real publication of the corruption rife 
within government and the ruling ZANU-PF party. “[S]enior military, government and ZANU-PF 
party officials purchased Toyota Cressida cars at a government controlled price of Z$27,000 and 
resold them on the black market” at a 200% profit (Mwatwara & Mujere, 2015:187). The scandal 
forced senior members of ZANU-PF such as Enos Nkala, Maurice Nyagumbo and Frederick Shava 
– Ministers of Defense, Political Affairs and State for Political Affairs respectively – to resign 
from the party and government in 1990. Resultantly, the Sandura Commission was set up to 
investigate the incident and subsequent resignations by those involved. Despite this however, the 
reporters who had broken the story were removed from their posts thus reflecting state control on 
the reporting of prebends and patronage. This was to mark the beginning of a long series of patron-
client exchanges that shape Zimbabwe as a neopatrimonial state (Mwatwara & Mujere, 2015:187-
8; Perlez, 1989; Tendi, 2013:840). 
 
Alexander highlights a third part of the militarisation process as the “posting of liberation war 
veterans and others with strong links to ZANU(PF) from senior ranks in the military to senior 
positions in state and parastatal institutions [as processes to] build and discipline a partisan state” 
(Alexander, 2013: 811). President Robert Mugabe and his successor, President Emmerson 
Mnangagwa, have made continuing appointments to state parastatals such as the CIO, the 
diplomatic corps, and media services, as well as to other influential state positions, to safeguard 
their interests and those of their networks, rather than the public (Alexander, 2013:811–812; 
Chitiyo, 2009:9; Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, 2011:9, 21–25; Eppel, 2013). The interdependence 
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with, and loyalism to, the centralised power of the executive was further highlighted when 
Brigadier General Douglas Nyikayaramba, former chairman of the National Railways of 
Zimbabwe, publically acknowledged the military’s preference for elections to be held in 2011, 
rather than 2013, and for Mugabe “to win those elections” on 27 May 2011 (Crisis in Zimbabwe 
Coalition, 2011:26). On 23 June 2011, Nyikayaramba referred to Prime Minister Morgan 
Tsvangirai as a “security threat” (The Herald, 2001, in Bratton, 2016:202). The securocrat’s public 
slander of a civilian leader later awarded him a promotion from President Mugabe (Bratton, 
2016:209). Tendi (2013) also depicts military elites’ partisan alignment with ZANU-PF and 
Mugabe whilst quoting an interview conducted with an unnamed military general – referred to as 
“General B” – in 2011: 
 
the system which has sustained us is that the party commands the gun. Baba ava garwi nhaka vari 
vapenyu. Akuna zuwa rino buda rimwe riripo. Hanti uri kuzvinzwa? [Translation: the father or ZANU 
PF cannot be replaced. You cannot inherit a living father’s throne. Two suns will never rise 
simultaneously. Do you understand me?]. (p. 837) 
 
Prospects of preserving democracy and strategising development waver when there are such robust 
displays of neopatrimonialism (Diamond, 1999; van de Walle, 2001:51–53). Mkandawire 
(2015:571) provides valuable insight in noting that such neopatrimonial cultures are perpetuated 
by “untoward deference to authority” shown by clients and owed to an “economy of affection … 
which lends normalcy to corruption” and subsequent prebendalism. As Moyo (2016:351) argues, 
“military officials have little background in macroeconomic policy or the professional ethos 
required for making [state enterprises and parastatals] deliver on their social and economic 
mandates”. The militarisation of Zimbabwe’s political arena remains problematic, as “a state that 
relies on military apparatuses to gain the consent of the citizenry cannot nurture a [progressive] 
ethos” (Matekere & El Moghazy, 2015:252). Likewise, the preserved status quo around the 
centralisation of power within the executive allows the military elite to benefit from socio-
economic as well as political benefits, serving to protect the president’s as well as the ruling party’s 
legitimacy (Matekere & El Moghazy, 2015:262). To buttress this, in the aftermath of the 2008 
post-electoral violence, General Martin Chedondo reaffirmed the mandate expressed by “General 
B” whilst noting that “soldiers are not apolitical” (BBC News, 2008; Tendi, 2013:837). The 
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presence of the security community in civic affairs is one of the key challenges in thwarting 
militarisation.  
 
In Zimbabwe, tensions in civil-military relations are evident in what Alexander (2013) cites as the 
final process of militarisation, which: 
 
constitute[s] a style of governance, most clearly embodied in the “operation”. As such, it was at odds 
with the bureaucratic state (and the ethics of a professional military) even if it at the same time invoked 
ideas of order associated with it. (p. 812)  
 
From 1980 onwards, such tactics were employed. Operation Quartz, set in motion by the 
Rhodesian military, was a last attempt at clinging to power in 1980. The Rhodesians sought to kill 
liberation nationalist guerrillas, as well as assassinate Mugabe and other nationalists, to thwart a 
Patriotic Front victory in March 1980 that would ensure Black majority rule (Kriger, 2003:25–66; 
Zimbabwe Institute, 2008:4).  
 
The legacy of this aspiration to a militarised style of governance has been seen in a series of 
ZANU-PF operations, in which counter-offensive measures against perceived “threats” to ruling 
elite hegemonies have been employed. These include: the Gukurahundi massacres of 1982–1987; 
operations in the Congo in 1997–1998; the farm invasions of 2000; Operations Murambatsvina 
and Operation Taguta in 2005; Operation Reduce Prices in 2007; Operations Makavhoterapapi, 
Chikorozha Chapera, and Hakudzokwi in 2008; as well as Operation Restore Legacy, in 2017, 
which ushered in the Mnangagwa regime (Alexander & McGregor, 2013; Amnesty International, 
2019; Bratton, 2016:82; CCJP, 1997; Chitiyo, 2009; Eppel, 2013; HRW, 2008; Kriger, 2003, 2012; 
Magaisa, 2019a; Sachikonye, 2011; Tendi, 2020; Zimbabwe Institute, 2008). These operations: 
 
circumvented, challenged and transformed state institutions that were capable, expert and largely if not 
entirely viewed as legitimate. The judiciary and the ministries concerned with local government and 
lands were initially targeted. Later operations made more specific interventions and engaged a 
transformed state in that work. Many operations offered opportunities for “looting” and patronage. They 
were used to intervene in a remarkable range of realms, including land tenure, urban and rural 
livelihoods, political freedoms, and the distribution and consumption of goods ranging from food to 
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agricultural inputs to housing to diamonds. They were a central means by which an alternative kind of 
power to that of the bureaucratic state institution was constructed. (Alexander, 2013:812) 
 
For the ruling ZANU-PF, the ideological shift from nationalism to elite protectionism saw an 
increase in the involvement of the security arm of the state in the control of institutions (Bratton, 
2016:200). This began, in 2000, with Operation Tsuro, which “involved approximately 1,500 war 
veterans, 1,000 soldiers of the 5th Brigade, 300 CIO operatives, approximately 200 members of 
the police, and 5-6,000 ZANU-PF volunteers, including ZANU-PF youth members” (Chitiyo, 
2009:4). Directed by the JOC, its aim was to forcibly take over white-owned commercial farms 
and to incite violence, arson, and murder against opposition members to ensure votes for ZANU-
PF through intimidation. Though the police initially tried to stop the militias, the operation carried 
on, as it was sanctioned by senior securocrats linked to the executive (Chitiyo, 2009:4).  
 
Noting a military operation as a governance method of last resort, Rupiya (2005:117) cites its 
enactment as a failure of the normative functions of state bureaucracy in most democracies 
(Rupiya, 2005:117). For Operation Tsuro, a “command-and-control” culture that reintegrated the 
JOC into the state to deal with various crises was key to ZANU-PF control. Operational zones, 
which identified as enemies those who were opposed to the elite agenda and as allies those who 
were for ZANU-PF, were also established. Finally, the framing of Operation Tsuro and its legacies 
has employed methods of violence and subversion of citizens by securitised actors within the 
ZANU-PF corps, to invoke fear and apathy whilst asserting power and control (Chitiyo & Rupiya, 
2005:359–360).  
 
A military operation, whilst adhering to strict timelines, is generally unsustainable given the “rapid 
deterioration of its utility” (Rupiya, 2005:118). Military-style operations perpetuate asymmetric 
civil-military relations, which is to the satisfaction of those leading interventions. These 
considerations further buttress the notion that under the control of securocrats, Zimbabwe remains 
a military operational zone, thus allowing the survival of ZANU-PF (Chitiyo & Rupiya, 2005:359; 
Rupiya, 2005:118). Essentially, this is the political continuity of civil-military relations in 
Zimbabwe favouring the ruling elite, supported by a neopatrimonial state (Alexander, 2013: 812; 
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Alexander & McGregor, 2013:753; Chitiyo, 2009:4–11; Hendricks & Hutton, 2009; Moyo, 2015; 
Tendi, 2013; Zimbabwe Institute, 2008).   
 
2. Accruing Benefits Through Networks of Survival 
 
Parallel to the deepening economic crisis in recent times, Zimbabwe has seen continued woes 
through the accumulation of resources by securocrats and their clients. Kriger (2012) gives a 
holistic overview of the intricate elite networks which sustain ZANU-PF. She notes that the party’s 
“competition with the ‘opposition’ parties…helps informal networks to cohere sufficiently to run 
a parallel government that effectively sabotages” progressive efforts between the ruling party and 
periphery actors such as the opposition, civil society and the citizens themselves (Kriger, 2012:12). 
McGregor (2013) problematises this approach in a rebuttal, which notes “‘parallel’ [as] a 
misleading metaphor because ZANU(PF) powers work within as well as outside state institutions, 
while ‘network’ removes hierarchy. ‘Informal’ can imply disorganisation, marginality and a 
separation from the realm of state” (McGregor, 2013:786–787). However, her criticism on a point 
of semantics is misguided, as the “parallel governments” works alongside ZANU-PF agendas and 
“networks” to maintain the existing hierarchy (Raftopoulos, 2013b: 20). This by no means 
informalises their impact nor their execution. As Khan (2010) notes: 
 
 operation of formal institutions can depend on informal institutions, and these interdependencies turn 
out to be very important. Institutions are informal when there are no formal rules written down and 
enforced by formal (state) enforcement, but there are nevertheless “rules” that are systematic enough to 
be identified. (p. 10) 
 
The “informality” of institutions is thus varied. Internalised values and norms may form the basis 
of internal informal networks that seek to support the operations of formalised institutions (Khan, 
2010:10). “Informality” in this instance is termed only as an irregular channel of operation and 
accumulation for elite interest. Informal patron-client networks are often of people with positions 
in state institutions, the party, and other influential positions, who make resource extraction by 
ZANU-PF elites and those aligned to them easier (Kriger, 2012:11).  
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The benefits of such neopatrimonialism were seen in the Ministry of Mines and Mining 
Development’s ability to pay civil servants a US$ 40 million increase in July 2011 – a duty outside 
its mandate – by retaining mining revenues and not submitting them to the Reserve Bank as per 
usual procedure (Kriger, 2012:16). This comes as then Minister Obert Mpofu had once referred to 
himself as Mugabe’s “ever obedient son” (News Day, 2010). Salary increases which constituted 
one-third of the Treasury’s monthly wage bill were authorised, despite civil servants already 
consuming 63% of the government’s annual budget.  Additionally, the ministry did not account 
for 90% of diamond revenue by November 2011, despite calls from the Ministry of Finance 
(Kriger, 2012:16). According to Kriger (2012:15), by 2008, “almost 40% of civil servants [were] 
youth militia [who had been] hired irregularly” by ZANU-PF. This example is indicative of the 
increased degree of party control of state institutions exercised by alliances in the security sector, 
government, traditional leaders, as well as other strategic actors (Kriger, 2012:13).  
 
In view of this evidence, McGregor’s (2013:787) calls for semantic clarity and her argument that 
the “conflation [of the state with ZANU-PF] is a prime object of political contestation”, are a 
deflection from the problem of incessant neopatrimonialism at hand, whilst the visibility and 
influence of the Zimbabwean military continues to grow within the bureaucratic state (Moyo, 
2015:160). The boundaries that McGregor proposes continue to be blurred not only within the 
networks that support elite rule, but also regarding client access to the country’s resources 
(Alexander, 2013:811–812; Kriger, 2012:12). 
 
This process was however contested not only by civilian technocrats, but historically by 
professional cadres who were opposed to the conflation of professional military duty and the 
governance of state institutions (Alexander, 2013:811; Tendi, 2013). Tendi (2016:205) warns that 
analysis on militarisation must not blindly assert “a façade of inflexible loyalism to Mugabe” 
within ZANU-PF and the military elite during his rule. Though he was the commander-in-chief of 
the ZDF, there were factions within ZANU-PF who spoke out against ill-governance. ZANLA 
liberation stalwarts, such as Josiah Tongogara and Edgar Tekere, grew critical of growing 
corruption under Mugabe’s regime and of efforts to create a one-party state under ZANU-PF. As 
later confirmed by Retired General Constantine Chiwenga (AllAfrica, 2017) and former ZIPRA 
intelligence chief Dumiso Dabengwa (New Zimbabwe, 2018), Tongogara was murdered shortly 
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after the ceasefire on 26 December 1979 for supporting Joshua Nkomo for the presidency and 
predicting Mugabe’s rule as a “total disaster”. Tekere, who was expelled from the ruling party in 
1988, ran for presidential office under the banner of the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM), but 
he failed to secure the majority vote (Tendi, 2013:838–840; Tendi, 2016:203).  
 
As noted earlier, a culture of maintaining the status quo is endemic within the Zimbabwean ruling 
elite, as they continue to benefit from regulating extractive state institutions. The politics of 
continuity impede interventions that could result in a loss of ZANU-PF power (Cheeseman & 
Tendi, 2010, in Kriger, 2012:12; Mkandawire, 2015:571). As such, despite the MDC entering the 
political executive arena through the GNU in 2008, ZANU-PF party political agendas always took 
precedence over national development ones (Kriger, 2012:12; Matyszak & Reeler, 2011). The 
ruling elite’s ability to perform the politics of continuity despite such structural governmental shifts 
displays the strength, control, and interconnectedness of the ZANU-PF network. It is characterised 
by ZANU-PF’s consistent navigation of state, security, society, and economy in governmental 




2.1 Surveillance by, and within, networks 
 
Surveillance in Zimbabwe is two-fold. First, as McGregor (2013: 783) argues “surveillance [is] 
central to ZANU(PF)’s strategy for urban control and to the politics of patronage”. Second, 
surveillance is to be understood through Tendi’s (2016) analysis of gendered surveillance of the 
elite from within. In other words, the extensive reach of state control and the maintenance of 
networks of accumulation are seen through the centralisation of power – which relies on 
surveillance.  
 
Militarised networks survive on secrecy. Information is meticulously collected through 
surveillance and tightly controlled for the (ab)use of ruling elites (de Waal, 2002a:75). McGregor 
outlines surveillance as “‘close observation, especially of a suspected spy or criminal’, [which] 
can achieve control in a manner that is distinct from coercion through force and threats” (Oxford 
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Dictionaries, 2013, in McGregor, 2013:785). Dependent on centralised institutions within the state, 
this remains a more “subtle” way of controlling state narratives and monitoring citizens than overt 
coercion (Alexander & McGregor, 2013:753). The state of surveillance is formed through elite 
projections of “suspicion, distrust and fear” (Purdekova, 2011, in McGregor, 2013:786). In 
Zimbabwe, one of its manifestations was the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act 
(AIPPA), which banned foreign correspondents and required journalists to register with the 
government (Bratton, 2016:77). Dense administrative bureaucracies with close linkages to the 
military elite are another characteristic of surveillance states (McGregor, 2013:785). According to 
Chitiyo (2009:12), the CIO – the state’s primary civilian intelligence institution – had 10,000 
permanent personnel in 2009. He further notes: 
 
The CIO is notorious for abductions and the use of torture to extract information. Although the CIO is 
funded by taxpayers’ money, it is awarded through nonpublic President’s Office funds, making it 
difficult to determine the CIO’s annual budget and expenditure. Nevertheless, salaries remain an issue 
for the CIO rank and file. As part of the President’s Office, the organisation has access to funds that are 
not readily available to other military sectors. CIO operatives wield considerable “private” power. 
(Chitiyo, 2009:12) 
 
The legacies of this, however, pre-date independence. Rhodesia’s legacy of surveillance and 
“centralised state bureaucracies, which were notable for their capacity for repression alongside 
their developmental ambition” continues to haunt Zimbabwe (Alexander & McGregor, 2013:751). 
Even in 2019, surveillance not only forms part of the state apparatus to subvert voices that oppose 
government policies, but formalises partisan regulation or citizen apathy through violence and 
coercion (Alexander & McGregor, 2013:757–758). This is illustrated by the previously mentioned 
example of Peter Magombeyi’s ordeal in September 2019. The incentive from higher-ranking 
officials is expressed through patronage to these clients – or at least to those in higher command 
who order the foot soldiers. McGregor (2013:792) notes that some positions, such as that of 
councillor, were once a way to access power and accumulate wealth. In the wake of the GNU, this 
culture spilt over into the MDC as well. Citing developments within Tsvangirai’s (MDC-T) 
faction, McGregor (2013:791) highlights that “MDC-T Provincial structures estimated that 70% 
of the MDC-T councillors in Harare and Chitungwiza were unemployed and did not own their own 
homes prior to being elected as councillor”. Not only was this corruptibility through a culture of 
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clientelism problematic, it reflected a wider systemic crisis in government in which poverty and 
lack of education made people vulnerable to being corrupted. Unconscious loyalism through 
deference to authority “cannot give rise to [a fair-minded] voice” as it becomes a form of survival 
rather than service (Hirschman, 1970:93, see also, Alexander & McGregor, 2013:758; 
Mkandawire, 2015:571-2). 
 
The narrative is different for those who are not beneficiaries of patron-client relations. Samantha 
Kureya’s ordeal on the evening of 21 August 2019 is testament to this. Samantha, a Zimbabwean 
satirist whose stage name is Gonyeti was abducted from her home by three masked men carrying 
guns and tortured. Notwithstanding her ordeal, in 2016, Kureya had been a police spokesperson 
denying circulating reports of police brutality towards citizens (Allison, 2019). For securocrats 
and their clients, loyalty is subject to their value addition to the specific elite agenda at the time. 
Those who oppose an agenda – even though they once supported it – are similarly subject to the 
militarised arm of the state. In 2017, this was also seen in the neutralisation of the ability of key 
branches of the security community – i.e. the CIO and the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) – to 
act against Operation Restore Legacy, which saw the end of Mugabe’s rule. The neutralisation was 
vital to the operation’s successful installation of the Mnangagwa regime (Tendi, 2020:40; Thomas-
Greenfield & Wharton, 2019:12). As Tendi (2019:8) notes, “[s]oldiers seized control of the ZRP’s 
Chikurubi armoury and systematically rounded up CIO operatives in order to disarm them”. The 
fluidity of subversion and surveillance must, therefore, be recognised. 
 
Surveillance also occurs within the elite spaces where conscious loyalism is present (Chitiyo, 
2009; Hirschman, 1970; Tendi, 2013, 2016, 2019). A key aspect of internal surveillance is seen in 
succession politics within ZANU-PF. Notwithstanding Sachikonye’s (2011:33) assertion that 
intra-party violence in ZANU-PF was “not lethal” and “not as vicious” as that unleashed on the 
opposition, the structural gendered violence generated as an outcome of surveillance tells a 
different story. Militarism and the cultures sustained in militarised masculinities reproduce 
societies that are far from being considered gender-neutral (Clarke, 2008:63; de Waal, 2002a:77). 
Hypermasculine notions of militarism normalise the sexualisation of women in positions of 
political prominence as an argument for their inclusion or exclusion into governing spaces, 
notwithstanding their liberation struggle credentials. This results in the reproduction of pervasive 
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gendered violence within a political culture that tokenises the expression of women as political 
agents within the securitised space as a form of survival (Ball et al., 2003; Bryden & Olonisakin, 
2010; Kunz, 2014; Mama & Okazawa-Rey, 2012:100).  
 
In 2014, former Vice President Joice Mujuru was accused of plotting to assassinate President 
Mugabe. Mujuru was met with gendered slurs, which accused her of using “sex to ensure political 
loyalty” amongst others, by members of an opposing ZANU-PF faction (Tendi, 2016:217). The 
gendered nature of surveillance highlights the adoption of hypermasculine power politics in 
Zimbabwe even by women through the “nature of surveillance material that is gathered and what 
is emphasized about this information” (Tendi, 2016:217). Grace Mugabe, who saw this as an 
opportunity to advance her political mileage, publically shamed Mujuru. She claimed to have “set 
up” and acquired a video of Mujuru “in a mini-skirt, speaking ill of [her] and [then] president” 
Robert Mugabe (Tendi, 2016:217). As Tendi (2016:217) notes, Grace Mugabe’s attempts at 
ascending to power “sought to exert moral authority over Mujuru” and were reflective of the 
patriarchal tensions within ZANU-PF. According to Moore (2018c: 8–9), Grace Mugabe’s later 
presence in the ZANU-PF succession race that fed into the coup of 2017, through the Generation 
40 (G-40) ZANU-PF faction,7 highlighted the “‘castration anxiety’ of the men around her” who 
dominated factional politics. Moore further notes that her previous persecution of Mujuru “rests 
its case on the certainty that ‘there must always be a harlot who can be brought to heel’” (Mudiwa, 
2017, in Moore, 2018c: 8). Gendered surveillance, as a tenet of control, is reflective of normalised 
hypermasculinity within the militarism discourse, which uses normalised notions of idealistic 
womanhood lodged in deference, rather than merit, as a barometer for competence when women 
no longer serve the broader political agenda of hegemonic elites (Kunz, 2014:604). This aspect of 
the politics of continuity is vital to understanding the gendered aspect of surveillance and the 
networks that inform it. 
 
The politics of continuity is also enabled by the network of state surveillance for the purposes of 
elite accumulation (Kriger, 2012; Moore, 2012). Economic strains in the late 1990s, caused by 
allegiances in the war in the Congo, pay-outs to war veterans in 1997, as well as the country’s 
Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP), led to the decline in civil servant service 
conditions which propelled strikes and gave rise to the labour movement (Alexander, 2013:811; 
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Dawson & Kelsall, 2013:55). In 1993, then Commander of the ZDF, Vitalis Zvinavashe, defined 
the role of the army during this period thus: “[as] an army our role during ESAP is to provide 
protection, undisturbed security and guard against any threats” (quoted in Tendi, 2013:837). 
 
This was despite legal injunctions inhibiting military personnel from interfering in the goings-on 
of the bureaucratic state (Moyo, 2015:164). Militarised interferences in civic and socio-economic 
issues became a regular occurrence, with human rights violations also rising, in response to 
protests over corruption and over sustainable economic opportunities by both civilians and war 
veterans (Eppel, 2009a, 2009b, 2013). The West’s preoccupation with eliminating communism in 
the region – given the ideology’s presence in South Africa at the time – Zimbabwe’s ruling elite 
was not sanctioned for human rights abused committed under the guise of domestic capitalist state 
protectionism (Doran, 2017; Moore, 2018c:3). Kriger (2012:12–13) and Raftopoulos (2009) cite, 
in this regard, the increased surveillance and prominence of informalised alliance politics during 
crises periods from 1998 onwards, given the rise of opposition politics. Tendi (2013:841) 
highlights the period from 2000 onwards as one under a mandate to protect ZANU-PF from the 
opposition as the perceived “threat”. During this period, “a system of mass politici[s]ation began 
in the rural areas” (Chitiyo & Rupiya, 2005:360). Other than villagers being forced to attend rallies, 
many chiefs were corrupted and pungwes – “political indoctrination sessions … used by guerrillas 
in the Second Chimurenga as a politicisation technique” – were reintroduced (Chitiyo & Rupiya, 
2005:360). Sachikonye (2011:9) refers to pungwes as an institutional legacy of guerrilla violence 
and coercion, as the compulsory meetings mobilised support for the indoctrination of partisan 
political agendas. It is then predictable that militarisation in the post-independence state continues 
to retain this characteristic, with former guerrillas now having become securocrats.  
 
Citing reasons further reasons for the increased presence of the military into becoming “a parallel 
state”, Chitiyo (2009:27) cites the rejection of 2000 the constitutional amendment as a defining 
moment in Zimbabwe’s history. In 2000, civil servants were deemed “politically disloyal, a far 
less tolerable source of difference for the ruling party than technocratic ideals” (Alexander, 
2013:811). The need to protect elite interests resulted in the politicisation of the public service and 
the de-professionalisation of their institutions coupled with a surge in security sector involvement 
from that year (Chitiyo, 2009:11). From 2000 onwards, it was common knowledge that non-
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partisan and opposition aligning citizens in public service were “being watched [and were at risk] 
of being seen as a traitor[s]” (McGregor, 2013:789). The notion of an ongoing struggle was 
founded in the government’s rejection of market-led economic transformation in favour of state-
led economic transformation named the Third Chimurenga or “Third Liberation War” against 
political and economic “threats” to disguise rampant neopatrimonialism within the state (Tendi, 
2013).  
 
The semantics of war and nationalist (yet partisan) protectionism of the state only sought to benefit 
patrons and clients associated with the ruling elite (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2011). The infiltration of 
such groups into the public service was a “lethal mix” as they acted as proxies for the state by way 
to additional recruitment of personnel into the security services (Scarnecchia, 2006, in Bratton, 
2016:82). This raised concerns over the distinction between regular and paramilitary functions and 
resulted in continued clemencies for human rights violations (Bratton, 2016:82).  Other than the 
infiltration of youth militia into civil service as clients and surveyors, “soldiers instituted a partisan 
and disciplinary surveillance over the professionals, justified by their own narrative of an ongoing 
liberation struggle” (Alexander & McGregor, 2013:753; Kriger, 2012:15). The legacies of such 
interventions can still be seen in 2019 and remain in direct contradiction to legal provisions 
prohibiting military personnel from politics. This is buttressed by Section 200 (2) and (3) of the 
2013 Constitution of Zimbabwe, which prohibits members of the civil service from engaging in 
politics from any partisan standpoint other than exercising their constitutional right to vote 
(Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2013; Moyo, 2015:164). Essentially, the positions given to these youth 
and other groups, such as war veterans, enabled extractive institutions, citizen intimidation, and 
anarchy through a network of surveillance to the benefit of ZANU-PF, whilst being against the 
rule of law in Zimbabwe.  
 
2.2 Accumulation and Business  
 
Securocrats have been pivotal to the politics of accumulation and neopatrimonialism in Zimbabwe. 
Tendi (2013:835) asserts that “Mugabe [retained] overall control of military elites, despite 
inconstant allegiance of some”. This was done through adherence to ZANU-PF hierarchical 
structures as explained in Chapter III (3). Despite the late General Solomon Mujuru’s advice to 
have a succession plan within ZANU-PF structures, President Mugabe isolated power in the 
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executive. Mugabe was insistent on the gradual decline of “military leaders’ power in relation to 
[him]” (Tendi, 2013:838). Factional politics between the Mujuru camp and the Mnangagwa camp, 
as well as Mugabe’s fears of Mnangagwa’s presidential aspirations, often spurred tokenised 
investigations into corruption charges under the Mugabe regime (Dawson & Kelsall, 2013:58). 
Under the Mnangagwa regime, this has not changed. For those who remain within party structures 
and benefit from the tenets of clientelism, there is an awareness to maintaining a clear stance on 
partisan politics in favour of the ruling elite remains in their best interests.  
 
The centralised control of rent-seeking can be further seen in the networks employed to support 
patrons in Zimbabwe (Khan, 2010:10; Kriger, 2012:12-6). As Alexander (2013:810) notes, 
ZANU-PF had inherited “a powerful, centralised, bureaucratic state and it greatly expanded its 
size and role in the 1980s, largely as a result of the extension of services to the [B]lack majority”. 
Consequently, a crucial legacy network remaining from the Rhodesian era is the elitist access to 
the business community (Zimbabwe Institute, 2008:3). A 2008 discussion paper by the Zimbabwe 
Institute (2008:16) illustrates this security-military-business network through the business interests 
of President Mnangagwa, who “spearheaded party operations” as the former Party Secretary for 
Finance, and the late General Solomon Mujuru, who used his access to mineral resources to expand 
his business empire. Their networks are noted as (still) including “business magnates like Billy 
Rautenbach and John Bredenkamp, former Finance Director of the Rhodesian Defence Force 
and…BAE Systems (British Aerospace) agent for Southern Africa” at the time (Zimbabwe 
Institute, 2008:16).  
 
In 2019, President Mnangagwa’s empire continues to expand with business allies such as 
Kudakwashe Tagwirei of Sakunda Holdings, which holds the monopoly on key economic 
pipelines, such as fuel in Zimbabwe through “Trafigura Zimbabwe, a joint venture with Trafigura, 
one of the world’s largest oil traders” (Cotterill, 2019). However, in between December 2019 and 
February 2020, Swiss-based Trafigura Pte bought out Sakunda’s 51% stake to 100% own 
Trafigura Zimbabwe (Moyo, 2020). As Cotterill (2019) reports, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) had warned the Zimbabwean government to stop printing money to facilitate pay-outs to 
Sakunda. Pay-outs such as the “$366m in government bonds [the company received] as payments 
for supplying “Command Agriculture”8 continue to plunge the struggling economy deeper into 
MANDIPA NDLOVU   MPHIL DISSERTATION 
 
74 
economic crisis” (Cotterill, 2019). Similarly, Vice President Constantine Chiwenga – a retired 
general – and his ex-wife, Jocelyn Chiwenga, also have major stakes in “agriculture [as well as] 
wildlife management and manufacturing” (Zimbabwe Institute, 2008:16). Elite networks remain 
mutually beneficial in the mandate for self-preserved accumulation. This remains juxtaposed 
against a socio-economic situation which continues to deteriorate for many citizens as highlighted 
in Chapter III (2.4). 
 
Commenting on the incestuous nature of elite networks, Raftopolous (1996 in Magure, 2012:69) 
alludes to the idea that ZANU-PF subverted an autonomous domestic bourgeoisie as their 
independence within a free market system “would not need to rely on ruling party patronage and 
thus would be less easy to control.” An increase in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is also reflective 
of the ruling elite’s wish to gain firm control of the economy (Magure, 2012:69). As Dawson and 
Kelsall (2013:58) note, “ZANU-PF’s business empire is both opaque and keenly contested by 
factions within the party” who seek to benefit from rents themselves. The protection of rents for 
personal gain is highlighted by Tendi (2013): 
 
Mugabe’s post-2000 prebendalism was designed to shore up ZANU(PF), amid the emergence of a 
credible opposition MDC party. Mugabe increasingly opened the state’s door to military elites, giving 
them their “turn to eat” and showing resolute determination to defend their new entitlements from an 
opposition party takeover. (p. 841) 
 
From independence onwards, negotiations for a shared vision for governance and development 
were carried out by technocratic bureaucrats and politicians alike. Patron-client relations that breed 
patronage economies, however, remain damaging to the economy, as self-preserving policies set 
by the elite continue to dictate governance strategies (Handley, 2008:5, in Magure, 2012:68; 
Zimbabwe Institute, 2008:14). Magure (2012:68) notes that this merging of the political and 
commercial elite is “compounded by a weak civil society and a weak opposition”, unable to call 
out rife clientelism.  
 
The monopolisation of self-preserving policies and its links to securocrats could be seen in 2005 
in the National State Security Council. Dominated by members of the security community, the 
Council was chaired by President Mugabe and included both Vice Presidents Joseph Msika and 
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Joice Mujuru. Other members included Reserve Bank Governor Gideon Gono, Defence Minister 
Sydney Sekeramayi, Home Affairs Minister Kembo Mohadi, and State Security Minister Didymus 
Mutasa. With nine departments tasked to manage “all economic sectors and it oversees foreign 
exchange and monetary policy”, the council became the de facto cabinet alongside the influential 
JOC (Zimbabwe Institute, 2008:14). Furthermore, as Dawson and Kelsall (2013) emphasise: 
  
ZANU-PF’s readiness to extract rents from business through regulatory predation increased insecurity 
for capital, raising costs, and it became increasingly profitable not to produce but to trade, seeking 
arbitrage on everything from foreign currency to fuel. In such an environment, a productive capitalist 
sector could not develop. (p. 53) 
 
Militarised interference can also be seen after the JOC’s Operation Reduce Prices – a clampdown 
to try and ease astronomical inflation rates – in 2007.  Businesses were forced to slash prices by 
more than 50% by appointed inspectors – most of whom were from the security community. Those 
who failed to comply were jailed (Zimbabwe Institute, 2008: 15). As Magure (2012) laments: 
 
ZANU PF’s militarised patronage system under the guise of indigenisation provides a perfect 
opportunity to well-connected members of the Zimbabwean ruling party-state complex to become rich 
overnight. Indications so far are that the implementation of the empowerment policy is vindictive and 
lacks transparency. (p. 80) 
 
 
Dawson and Kelsall (2013:55) argue that the relationship between, “white financial power … and 
[B]lack political power” began to “crumble” in the late 1990s as the ZANU-PF agenda of self-
preservation became clearer. It can, however, be argued that white monopoly capital simply 
diversified its assets and investments; and sought to gain access to the market through methods 
different from those it had been accustomed to using before independence and farm invasions. One 
such method has involved white monopoly capitalists aligning themselves with ruling Black 
majority securocrats to ensure their interests are preserved. This is exemplified in the 
aforementioned relationships with Billy Rautenbach and John Bredenkamp, as well as in the 
support given to the Mnangagwa regime by white Zimbabweans who attended a ZANU-PF rally 
in July 2018 staged specifically for them ahead of the presidential election (Al Jazeera, 2018; 
Zimbabwe Institute, 2008:16). This further adds to the notion that Mnangagwa had appeased 
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certain white farmers in the Midlands, such as the Coetzee family, founders of Dendairy (a major 
player in the dairy industry) who have been farming in Kwekwe – Mnangagwa’s hometown and 
political stronghold until the July 2018 elections – for over 50 years (Bratton, 2016:202; Laing & 
Thornycroft, 2016). Protection and accumulation in business can, thus, not be seen along racial 
lines. The allocation of resources remains influenced by the political progression of the ruling elite 
for the protection of investments. This is the case even as ZANU-PF remains unforgiving of those 





2.3 Accumulation and Diamonds 
 
In 1997, the ZDF, together with the armed forces of Angola, Namibia, and the DRC, was deployed 
in the DRC to support Congolese President Laurent Kabila against an insurgency (supported by 
Rwanda and Uganda) in the First Congo War, coined “Africa’s First World War”. The ZDF was 
deployed to Kinshasa and Mbuji Mayi to protect the Congolese government and the country’s 
major diamond region respectively (Chitiyo, 2009:7). This changed the dynamics within the 
Zimbabwean military. Personal accumulation of wealth by senior military personnel was stark and 
“bled national resources”, with the campaign in the DRC costing Zimbabwe US$1 million a day 
in 1998–1999 (Sachikonye, 2011:23). This included Emmerson Mnangagwa, the late General 
Solomon Mujuru, and other senior members of the JOC (Kriger, 2012:22). In 1998, a joint venture 
between the ZDF and the Congolese was formed through the trading company Congo-Duka. 
Operation Sovereign Legitimacy (OSLEG) replaced Congo-Duka and gave way for another joint 
venture company, Cosleg, with Kabila’s Comiex-Congo (Dawson & Kelsall, 2013:58). In 2002, 
the 10,000 troops that had been placed in charge of Kabila’s protection were withdrawn from the 
DRC; however, as Dawson and Kelsall (2013:58) note, “military and commercial activity 
continued”. As Chitiyo (2009) further writes: 
 
various trade and service agreements between the Zimbabwean and Congolese government formalised 
the ZDF’s role as military entrepreneurs who profited from access to diamonds, cobalt and other 
Congolese resources. Zimbabwe’s military, business and political elite became part of a global network 
of diamond dealers who profited from the Congo war. Although Zimbabwe’s military presence in the 
DRC was downscaled in 2002, the Harare-Kinshasa diamond “axis” has remained, with Harare itself 
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becoming a major entrepôt in the illicit diamond trade. The Congo trade and Zimbabwe’s internal 
diamond “industry” have cemented the Zimbabwe military’s role as the dominant class in Zimbabwe’s 
business community. (p. 7)  
 
Commercial and mining revenues are an example of elite accumulation within the formal state 
thus solidifying extractive institutions, patron-client relations and anti-development strategies 
through policies that only benefitted the elite (Dawson & Kelsall, 2013; Moore, 2012). Noted by 
Dawson and Kelsall (2013:58), “Mugabe has been careful to preserve control over the party while 
meeting the rent expectations of his generals elsewhere (for example, the DRC, SOEs, farms and 
the Chiadzwa diamonds)”. In 2004, the late General Mujuru became director of River Ranch mine 
located in the South-West of Zimbabwe which he owned with ZANU-PF Central Committee 
Member Trivanhu Mudariki, and an investor Saudi Arabia. This asset is said to be at the core of 
his succession struggles within his party (Partnership Africa Canada, 2010:8 in Kriger, 2012:22). 
Sachikonye (2011: 23) infers that the DRC entrenched the conscious realisation of the military as 
part of both the bureaucratic state and of the political hierarchy, where it remained an “interested 
party” in ZANU-PF accumulation strategies – within the governance structures of the state.  
 
Whilst accumulation occurred, surveillance was omnipresent. As Kriger (2012:21) notes, “[the] 
police, prisons service, army, and CIO have got groups of people who are working for those 
lieutenants, known as ‘syndicates’”. The benefits of illicit mining activities, thus, flow to 
securocrats in Zimbabwe (Sachikonye, 2011:23).  
 
As Alexander (2013:812) highlights, securocrat involvement in diamond mining – especially, from 
2006 onwards, in Marange district – “‘cemented’ their ‘role as the dominant class in Zimbabwe’s 
business community’”. The JOC oversaw the Chiadzwa mines in Marange district, where 
diamonds were mined even after the disbanding of the JOC in the aftermath of the 2008 GPA 
(Partnership Africa Canada, 2010, and Raftopoulos, 2010:221–222, in Kriger, 2012:21). Since the 
GNU, only five companies have been granted licenses to mine in Marange: “two Chinese 
companies, two South African private companies[,] Mbada and Canadile[,] and Pure Diamonds” 
(Kadzere, 2010, and Veritas, 2011, in Kriger, 2012:21). The state-owned Zimbabwe Mining and 
Development Corporation (ZMDC) created a subsidiary, Marange Resources, in July 2009, to 
manage its joint ventures, becoming a 50% owner of Mbada and Canadile. The Chinese companies 
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were under the patronage of then Chief of the ZDF, General Constantine Chiwenga, and Chief of 
the CIO, Happy Bonyongwe (HRW, 2010:6, Global Witness 2010: 15, Partnership Africa Canada, 
2010:5, and Swain, 2011, in Kriger, 2012:22). However, the benefits of “mining concessions only 
continue as long as the personal relationships that made them possible remain productive” (Kriger, 
2012:22). Violence is often unleashed to subvert those who are no longer viewed as enablers of 
the system of accumulation. 
 
In November 2010, six executive directors of the two diamond mining corporations – Mbada and 
Canadile – were “arrested for suspected fraud over a licence to mine” in Marange (BBC, 2010). 
According to one of the arrested, Lovemore Kurotwi – “[t]he largest shareholder of the private 
company that joined ZMDC to form Canadile… a senior figure in the Fifth Brigade” (Kriger 
2012:22) and nephew of former Commander of the ZDF, Vitalis Zvinavashe – this arrest was a 
backlash from Minister of Mines and Mining Development, Obert Mpofu. Mpofu had allegedly 
requested a US$ 10 million bribe which Kurotwi refused to pay. According to a letter written by 
Kurotwi to parliament, the “personal, selfish interests’ highlights [sic] the personalised nature of 
this conflict and the way in which the [elite] actors [used] the court and the parliament to resolve 
it” (Kriger, 2012:22).  
 
The result was ZMDC taking 100% ownership of Canadile and the acquittal of five of the six board 
members arrested. However, the Kurotwi case continued (Kriger, 2012:22). The effect of 
securocrat involvement upon civilians in Marange can be seen in the “paramilitary attacks against 
illegal gold and diamond panners” (Chitiyo, 2009:6). Operations Chikorozha Chapera and 
Hakudzokwi (trans. Operations No More Mining and No Return) were characteristic of these 
attacks, with over 300 civilian fatalities reported, and further showed the abuse of power, and the 
violent tactics for self-preservation used, by securocrats. The militarisation process involving 
operations to preserve elite interests will be discussed later in this chapter (Chitiyo, 2009:6). 
 
Even within elite spaces, mutual commercial and rent accumulation is dependent on the absence 
of competition, thus reflecting the militarised nature of Zimbabwe’s political economy (Alexander, 
2013:812; Bratton & Masunungure, 2008:47; Chitiyo, 2009:4–11; Dawson & Kelsall, 2013:57–
59). In August 2011, General Solomon Mujuru was burnt to death inside his farmhouse. His 
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“suspicious death”, as well as that of his key diamond buyer in a car accident a few days prior to 
his, has continued to question the violence of the politics of accumulation in Zimbabwe. These 
fatalities have often been linked to the wishes of the JOC and Mnangagwa to have “exclusive 
access to mining Marange diamonds”, which had always been inhibited by Mujuru as a shareholder 






2.4 Accumulation and Land 
 
Another key aspect of securocrat accumulation in Zimbabwe has been the control and ownership 
of land. This follows on as a legacy of the 1969 Land Tenure Act which “consolidated primitive 
accumulation” by 6000 white Rhodesian farmers (Dawson & Kelsall, 2013:51). Section 16 of the 
provisional Lancaster House Agreement of 1979, considered the land question one of the most 
contested rents in Zimbabwe’s political economy discourse. Section 16 sought to guarantee 
property rights of white Rhodesian farmers for ten years starting in 1980. In 1990, the 1992 Land 
Acquisition Act which facilitated the “willing buyer-willing seller” principle was adopted 
(AAPPG, 2009:32). In the early 1990s, ownership of all commercial farm lands in Zimbabwe by 
ZANU-PF members in government positions was projected at 8% (van de Welle, 2001:122). This 
was not reflective of an overall change of ownership within wider society. Following ZANU-PF’s 
loss of the February 2000 referendum that had proposed changes towards government acquisition 
of land without compensation to Zimbabwe’s Constitution as well as political gains within the 
MDC; 4000 farmers were violently removed from their farms by ZANU-PF aligned youth militia 
and war veterans. Resultantly, prior to the general election in June 2000, the number of government 
acquired farms doubled to 2,942 from an initial 1,471 (AAPPG, 2009:35-7). This showed that 
efforts to safeguard the “national” to be within the confines of securing ZANU-PF hegemonic 
power and accumulation. 
 
Even in the political settlement of 2008, the land question remained pivotal and unaddressed under 
Article V of the GPA (Zimbabwe Institute, 2008:3-5; Matyszak & Reeler, 2011:11-5). Legally, 
elements of accountability which bind government were not plausible as government were not 
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bound to the GPA. Again, the common conflation of the state with the ZANU-PF party was 
“unwittingly” constructed thus creating technical inaccuracies for implementation of any reforms 
(Matyszak & Reeler, 2011:14). Moreover, recommendations for a land survey and land audit, as 
part of efforts at redistribution and accountability, further misunderstood the lack of political will 
in the historical ruling elite to undertake such a project and to relinquish power. ZANU-PF refused 
to engage with the question of redistribution whilst targeted Western sanctions against party elites 
remained (ICG, 2010:1; Matyszak & Reeler, 2011:15). Tendi (2013:841) highlights that from 1980 
to 2000, ZANU-PF pushed the narrative of nationalist politics, buttressed by justifications for the 
contested Third Chimurenga. In the post-2000 period, the ruling party shifted to protect itself from 
rising political opposition through a process of militarised re-centralisation, backed by patronage 
and the politics of accumulation (Dawson & Kelsall, 2013:58; Tendi, 2013:837–841; Zimbabwe 
Institute, 2008:2). As Alexander and McGregor (2013) note: 
 
[c]ontrol over land and mineral resources has been the source of immense political capital for 
ZANU(PF), as partisan access has been used to win votes in the countryside and towns and to undercut 
the [opposition], which has had little or nothing in terms of material reward to offer its supporters. (p. 
758) 
 
This mismanagement has resulted in “land tenure insecurity” thus impeding prospects for 
agricultural outputs and subsequent food security (Welborn et al., 2019:29). With land, as “a 
primary method by which ZANU PF dispenses patronage, secures support, and commands loyalty” 
(Matyszak & Reeler, 2011:15), hopes that the GPA would address this endemic clientelist problem 
were ambitious. This is illustrated by the November 2008 ruling by the SADC tribunal to grant 
compensation to white farm owners that was thwarted by the Zimbabwe High Court (Bratton, 
2016:225). Furthermore, a legacy of ZANU-PF neopatrimonialism is seen in how Minister of 
Finance under the Mnangagwa regime, Mthuli Ncube, who was appointed on supposed 
technocratic merits, received a nearly 8,400-hectare farm near Hwange from the Ministry of Lands 
and Agriculture in 2002 (Moore, 2012: 7). Yet, in 2019, as Minister of Finance, he is an integral 
part of the exclusive patron-client network that oversees Zimbabwe’s anti-development trajectory 
(Dawson & Kelsall, 2013: 49).  
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Rents have been a key aspect of ZANU-PF control since independence, and military accumulation 
has simultaneously been on the rise (Mwatwara & Mujere, 2015). Violence has typically been a 
means to achieving this end, as seen in the methods used to undertake the Zimbabwe’s land reform 
programme since 2000 (Sachikonye, 2011:37). Violent interventions towards accumulation are 
historically entrenched in societies and can be linked to literature around conquest, power, and 
self-interest (Moore, 2012:5). Outside neo-classical economic analyses, rent-seeking evolves 
policies and institutions when accrued outside government created monopolies that grant surety to 
elites. If citizen agency is to contribute to robust institutions, rent-seeking must be made inclusive 
and presented as a consultative process guided by formal rules and institutions. In countries like 
Zimbabwe, however, rent-seeking remains centralised, which renders it unregulated (Khan, 


























Problems with Transforming Institutions 
 
 
Figure 1 Note Apt illustration of the cyclical nature of injustice in Zimbabwe 
 
 
Source: Musarurwa et al., 2016:141 
 
 
The securocrat problem is still a key concern for Zimbabwe in 2019. That said, the question for TJ 
interventions remains a reiteration of the one initially posed by Diamond (1988:24): “how [can TJ] 
transform the complex nature of civil-military relations so that the military evolves into a 
“professional body” that stands outside politics and civil society”? As the visibility and influence 
of the Zimbabwean military continues to grow in the political economic space under the 
Mnangagwa regime, the complex realities of addressing Zimbabwe’s challenges, given the 
endemic politics of continuity by elites, deepen (Cheeseman & Tendi, 2010, in Kriger, 2012:12; 
Hoffman, 2012:138-44; Moyo, 2015:160). As Bratton and Masunungure (2018:16) note: “[i]n the 
end, the greatest resource available for healing the beloved country is the citizenry itself”. 
Progression through state institutions is then based on informal relationships rather than formal 
institutional rules. These realities are steeped in power relations and the active efforts made at re-
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aligning them for personalised survival (Alexander & McGregor, 2013:758). Rent-seeking ideally 
evolves policies and institutions for the better however it is difficult when the process remains 
extractive in this manner (Khan, 2017). Institutional reform is then needed to rupture the current 
modus operandi which relies on suppressing political neutrality whilst offering patronage for 
loyalties (Hirschman, 1970; Mkandawire, 2015:571-2). Likewise, where social protections for 
citizens are concerned, patronage power politics inhibit economic growth, poverty reduction and 
redistributive wealth as the economics of clientelism are not sustainable (Magure, 2012:80).   
 
Tackling patronage economies has direct linkages to challenging the institutions and elites that 
enable their existence. TJ efforts – in particular SSR programmes – are vital as a main facilitator 
for political settlements in post-conflict and post-authoritarian institutions, though political will is 
needed (Bratton, 2016:189–229). To achieve development and socio-economic progression 
through existing institutions, Acemoglu and Robinson (2013) argue for inclusive, rather than 
exclusive (inherently extractive), institutions. Access to the political space in this instance is equal; 
where political competition and transferral of political power is both accessible and fluid regardless 
of one’s partisan political views. Deciphering at which level institutions should be inclusive and 
the type of inclusion that is to be presented for effectiveness, also remains a strategic challenge for 
potential transitional processes. This is even more so when political settlements analysis still does 
not address profound questions, such as those of enforceability and commitments to the credibility 
of agreements and institutions within a state (Khan, 2018:671). Khan (2010) posits a more critical 
approach if one’s desired outcome is a developmental state which favours sustainable economic 
growth. For Khan (2010:13), the “organisation of power” within institutions, rather than 
institutions themselves, is crucial to determining the costs and benefits of re-engineering existing, 
or creating new, institutions. He argues that too much power given to varied bargaining groups 
within a political space is unlikely to build developmental institutions as government may disinvest 
if it believes it will lose upcoming elections (Khan, 2010; Hickey, 2015).  
 
In this case, rebuilding Zimbabwe is to be approached from a Khanian (2010) perspective that is 
centred on debunking power dynamics. Likewise, Hendricks (2005: 121) stresses that “[r]e-building 
Zimbabwe requires far more than elite pacting. It involves building the institutions and the capacity 
that sustain democratisation and avoiding the slippery slope between democracy and autocracy”. 
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Though this is true, elite pacts also facilitate the functioning of institutions and the progression or lack 
thereof of democratic progression in the state. This inherent challenge of the distribution of power 
is dictated by the structure of the contextual political settlement and the actors that operate within 
it (Khan, 2018:672). Sachikonye (2011:82) buttresses this by highlighting how ZANU-PF controls 
most resources during various election campaigns, though “this has not necessarily translated to 
votes”. Here, the ruling elite disinvest in strengthening formal institutions towards developmental 
institutions and coerce legitimacy through manipulation and control of electoral outcomes and 
state sponsored violence upon those who disagree with their preferred outcome (Eppel, 2013:211; 
Moore, 2012:1-2).  
 
Weak institutions with limited capacities remain ineffective. Collapsing institutions breed 
unsustainable economic prospects in patronage economies which challenge wealth creation for the 
average citizen. This is specifically problematic where regeneration of rents and resources is 
stagnant whilst illicit exchanges continue (Khan, 2017; Magure, 2012:80). Navigating Zimbabwe 
out of a state of neopatrimonial militarism must, therefore, be a process that targets key aspects of 
militarisation and its effect on institutions (Alexander, 2013; Brown & Ní Aoláin, 2014). This 




Navigating Militarism, TJ and SSR 
 
Though institutional capacity must be enhanced while deconstructing the militarisation of 
Zimbabwean society, human security aspects must not be omitted during the transformative 
process (Hutchful, 2009:10; Lambourne, 2009). The need for SSR is then essential. SSR mandates 
itself with navigating shifting militarised power politics and political settlements in post-conflict 
and post-authoritarian settings (Hutton, 2010:203). As Bryden and Olonisakin (2010) note: 
 
[a] holistic definition of SSR stresses the need for an effective, well-managed and accountable security 
sector that requires the application of sound public sector management principles. SSR is [thus] 
identified as a human security issue that must combine development, human rights and security 
concerns. Significantly, security and justice reforms are regarded as parallel, mutually reinforcing 
processes. (p. 8) 




Within peace and security literature, SSR is located at the intersection of “traditional security 
sector-related interventions with broader good governance and democratization imperatives” 
(Hutton, 2010:192). SSR is then to be understood as s a tenet of TJ (Mayer-Rieckh & Duthie, 
2009:2). The lack of SSR in Zimbabwe stems from “the colonially inherited paradigm of uneven 
development” as Hendricks and Hutton (2009:1) note. Institutions have remained extractive whilst 
the economics of neopatrimonialism have remained dominant in the Smith and Mugabe regimes 
as well as now during the Mnangagwa regime. All this whilst blanket clemencies have continued 
and regime transitions repeat missed opportunities to deliberately recreate replicas of the systems 
that benefit elite accumulation (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2013:410; Eppel, 2004:50; Hendricks & 
Hutton, 2009:2). This has buttressed a culture which supports the interests of elites with bargaining 
power within society and does not favour bottom-up justice efforts to allow a pervasive “securocrat 
problem” (Hendricks & Hutton, 2009:11-12; ICG, 2010:11-3). This is particularly true within the 
security community which has been favoured with impunity (Brown & Ní Aoláin, 2014:143; 
Eppel, 2013:213-4). Attention to civil-military education and the re-engagement with a history 
other than the one manufactured by the state since 2000 to demonise ZAPU, MDC, the Rhodesians, 
the West, and the United Kingdom (UK), are necessary (Chitiyo, 2009:40). The work of memory 
studies and of telling accurate histories in thwarting denialisms of perpetration and forcing 
accountability is also vital to the process of reform (Brown & Ní Aoláin, 2014:143; Eppel, 
2013:213-4). Yet, undertaking SSR that leverages transitional justice’s “heavy reliance on the 
universality of human rights norms” (Brown & Ní Aoláin, 2014:144) and rethinking the securitised 
landscape of Zimbabwean politics, remain challenging in a context where institutions and socio-
economic protections are designed to protect securocrats (Anderson, 2011 in Eriksson Baaz & 
Verweijen, 2018:60; Cheeseman & Tendi, 2010, in Kriger, 2012:12; Teitel, 2000:4).  
 
As noted in the previous chapter analysing TJ, liberal processes that shift political cultures based 
on political will and a lack of acknowledgement or retribution recreate cycles of injustice (Eppel, 
2013:211-50; Dancy et al., 2013:8). Seen in the 1979 Lancaster House Agreement, the 2008 GPA 
as well as the sanitisation of the 2017 coup d’état; post-settlement efforts at reform coupled with 
inconsistent application of SSR provisions by both the United Nations (UN) and the African Union 
(AU) are problematic for concretised understandings of the application and implementation of SSR 
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where Zimbabwe is concerned (Hutchful, 2009:10; Louw-Vaudran, 2017, in Bailie, 2018). Though 
Zimbabwe’s stability and reconstruction remains beneficial to the region; sovereignty and elite 
interest has been a “stumbling block for outside intervention” where peace and security are 
concerned (Hendricks, 2005:119; Hendricks & Hutton, 2009:12; Mutisi, 2011). The 
inconsistencies at regional and continental levels often translate into lack of clarity which enables 
corrupt governments to interpret the security sector brief in a way that suits their best interests 
when accused of violating good governance principles (Ball et al., 2003; Hendricks, 2005:119-
20). Here, much needed reforms such as the re-professionalisation of state institutions such as the 
ZEC are currently unattainable (Chitiyo, 2009:38). This remains as a challenge for revising 
asymmetric power hierarchies present within the domestic security community. Issues of 
legitimacy and power within long term security sector governance remain unaddressed and 
cyclical episodes of violence within militarized societies continue (Ball et al., 2003:294).  
 
When engaging in state reforms, the immediate aspiration is often towards one of purist democratic 
attributes. One must however grasp that the political culture has not caught up to match the political 
will needed for institutional changes (Bratton, 2016:208). The hard work of changing systemically 
entrenched institutions – especially those that support branches of the security sector and political 
economy – is that their legitimacy and integrity must be rebuilt to affect plausible SSR for both 
security personnel as well as citizens (Chitiyo, 2009:34; Hendricks & Hutton, 2009:12). Failure to 
do this, as per the prediction by the ICG report, Zimbabwe: Political and Security Challenges to 
the Transition (2010) could: 
 
prevent a smooth transition to the post-Mugabe era and raise real prospects of a coup, with accompanying 
instability that would affect the whole region. A dozen or so “securocrats” – senior military and intelligence 
figures – are widely considered to hold de facto veto power over any real transition. (p.4) 
 
The above forecasts extracted from the 2010 report have come to pass and still haunt the country 
in 2019. The lack of SSR in Zimbabwe has resulted in entrenched influence of securocrats as “the 
bedrock for ZANU-PF in political governance” which services patron-client accumulation (Mutisi, 
2011:4). Acts of state-sanctioned subversion continue to be met by those seeking to transform 
Zimbabwean institutions in 2019 (Amnesty International, 2019). As Kriger (2012:12-13) notes, 
violence and patronage are “often interdependent processes” to build power. Moore (2012:2) 
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identifies violence as revealed in two forms when there is accumulation at stake. Firstly, to those 
without access to alternative accumulative possibilities are easily recruited into brutal enterprises. 
Secondly, when opposition to the project of accumulation is felt (Moore, 2012:2). Formal rules for 
governance and inclusive development dictated by what is deemed to be ‘rational’ for attaining 
legitimacy are deemed less important than economic incentives for elite accumulation (Weber, 
1978:1006-1110, in Khan, 2005:10).  
 
As a leader, based on Kahneman (1994)’s reading, rationality is assumed as optimal decisions for 
the benefits of preserving one’s legitimacy. Even in 2019, when protests erupted due to a lack of 
social protections and economic opportunities, there was a direct response from the military and 
other state security forces for elites to retain positions of power (Ndlovu, 2018; Amnesty 
International, 2019; Raftopolous, 2019). Their deployment prompted “government to funnel 
additional funds towards the military, reducing funding available for other [civic] priorities” 
(Welborn et al., 2019:25). As Khan (2005:12) highlights, “patron-client factions…compete for the 
capture of public resources in ways that are relatively unconstrained by economic viability 
considerations”. Attempted constraints would be challenged. SSR remains useful in the 
redistribution of military budgets to poverty reduction initiatives (Mayer-Rieckh & Duthie, 
2009:1). Calls for measures to reduce military budgets are however unlikely as things stand in 
2019 (Bratton, 2016:205-7; Chitiyo, 2009:43; Hendricks & Hutton, 2009:12-13).  
 
This expression of a self-preserving form of survival by the ruling elite forms the antithesis of 
bureaucratic rationality in the neopatrimonial state (Alexander & McGregor, 2013:758; Khan, 
2005:11). Reversing militarisation must include those who uphold the system (Chitiyo, 2009; 
Eriksson Baaz & Verweijen, 2018:62). These are determined by political will and monitored by 
state institutions alongside a technocratic, non-partisan civil society (Bratton, 2016:205-8; 
Eriksson Baaz & Verweijen, 2018). The goal is to enhance “effective and accountable security for 
the [s]tate and its peoples without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the 
rule of law” (Ki-Moon, 2008:6). Given SSR’s tall order during the transitioning process, there 
must be a shared normative commitment to constitutional rules which are binding to all citizens if 
the human security project is to be accomplished in Zimbabwe through truth and accountability 
(de Greiff & Duthie, 2009:25). 




A matrixed approach to SSR is needed given the militarised state of political affairs in Zimbabwe. 
This is important to legitimate previously disregarded credible political actors who should be part 
of the political settlement such as citizens (Bratton, 2016:205-6; Brown & Ní Aoláin, 2014). Where 
TJ interventions that seek to establish non-resurgence of violence are concerned, Teitel (2000:3) 
cautions, “a state’s transitional responses [are] explained largely in terms of the relevant political 
and institutional constraints”. The independence and depoliticisation of the judiciary which is 
necessary to rebuilding trust between the state and its citizens by affecting the rule of law (Chitiyo, 
2009:38; Hendricks & Hutton, 2009:9-10). This is to aid the “structurally poor” who remain 
impoverished due to failed socio-economic policies are expected to remain politically apathetic 
and economically impoverished given the effects of continued elite sanctioned patronage systems 
(de Waal, 2002a:78). Political resonance remains the largest constraint as institutional militarised 
institutions remain closed and inflexible to downscaling budgets (Dancy et al., 2013; Hendricks & 
Hutton, 2009:13; Mayer-Rieckh & Duthie, 2009:1; Welborn et al., 2019:25). As such, “[j]ustice 
seeking in these periods is fully epiphenomenal and best explained in terms of the balance of 
power” (Teitel, 2000:3). To support this, Kriger (2006:206) stresses the need to rethink the role of 
TJ processes in reproducing new political orders that may through exclusion of laws that recognise 
contributions to equitable democracy within transitional periods and merely regurgitate or reinvent 
unjust political orders. This is challenged by the legacy of militarism. 
 
De Waal (2002a:78) notes that in an ideologically right-wing militarist system, “individuals who 
are authoritarian, elitist, secretive and exult in violence will rise to the top”. The decentralisation 
of power from the executive which leverages itself off allegiances to militarised elites must then 
be addressed (Diamond, 1988:26-7). Ndlovu-Gatsheni’s (2003:31-3) previously discussed 
criticisms of the 1987 Unity Accord remain useful as a blueprint for conditions of post-conflict 
settlements which are likely to led to healthy civil-military relations, social cohesion, peace and 
security in Zimbabwe. Once this has occurred, the petition previously highlighted through Eppel’s 
(2013) literature to pay “attention to the needs and expectations of conflict participants” 
(Lambourne, 2009:9) is to be fulfilled if the process of reform is to be sustainable.  
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De Waal (2002a:78) further suggests inroads towards peace as possible through civilian 
mobilization within society as “power relations inherent in this manifestation of militarism are 
antithetical to any form of civil action of this kind”. This is buttressed by notions that redressing 
past violations is a developmental goal for post-conflict and post-authoritarian states as 
“systematic human rights violations undermine human capacities” (de Greiff & Duthie, 2009:12). 
Regaining active citizenry from a trust deficit requires adherences to “economic security and 
freedom to live in dignity in terms of good governance, democratisation and protection of human 
rights” (Lambourne, 2009:9; Eppel, 2013; Moyo, 2019b:9). TJ processes have the capacity to grant 
agency to previously disenfranchised and victimised citizens by repositioning them as active 
agents in the political project of the state with social capital (de Greiff & Duthie, 2009:1, 22-3). 
This is however “political process, not a technical one” (Mayer-Rieckh & Duthie, 2009:4).  
 
Political direction supersedes military coherence (Nkomo, 1984:156). The understanding that SSR 
is a political project that requires buy-in from citizens and elites alike is pivotal to this. For citizens 
to re-engage with democratic institutions, re-establishing vertical civic trust in relation to 
government accountability is vital (Mihr, 2013:310). This opens up the civic space and grants 
ordinary people “control over politicians and political institutions” in order to redefine strong 
political settlements between ruling elites and citizens (Diamond & Morlino, 2005 : xiii, in Mihr, 
2013:310). In the aftermath of violence and injustice, “the less a country in transition can count on 
support, initiatives, or pressure from the international community, the less likely its political elites 
are to start the process” (Mihr, 2013:304). Likewise, lack of pressure to engage in truth-seeking 
initiatives produces the same result.  
 
Governments under local and international pressure to pursue TJ initiatives to consolidate their 
legitimacy often install commissions of inquiry to show attention to grievances presented. In 
theory, this reflects responsiveness and promotes civic trust and should lead to civic participation 
(Mihr, 2013:304-5). However as discussed, in Zimbabwe, the legacies of such efforts have 
reflected engagement in theory rather than a commitment to implementation in practice (Amnesty 
International, 2002:16; Sitze, 2013:11-4). Essentially, the potential transformative relationship 
between TJ, development and democracy relies heavily on the “responsiveness and accountability 
of political elites, transparency, adherence to international human rights norms, and participation 
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by citizens” (Mihr, 2013:311). Without this, even if SSR, transformative apologies and other TJ 
engagements occur, defaulting back to the status quo remains high (Mihr, 2013; Tarusarira, 
2019:212-3). Unchallenged political cultures which have assisted in the accumulation of resources 
and power for securocrats propel the abuse of state institutions. To challenge the system to 
transform a society and political economy, citizens must aspire to higher political expectations 
(Diamond, 1999; Mihr, 2013:310). This however assumes the presence of agency in the absence 
of securocrat subversion. As such, in roads must be made to apply pressure towards the 
decentralisation and depersonalisation of formal state institutions such as the judiciary and the 
executive – spaces which remains violently bound to serving elite interests in Zimbabwe 
(Alexander, 2013:811; Mihr, 2013:310; Sachikonye, 2011; Tendi, 2013:837). 
 
Whilst Zimbabwe seeks transition out of authoritarianism, there are impediments in the culture of 
militarisation that hamper the prospects for non-recurrence. The first impediment is that 
maintaining a culture of authoritarianism and elitism relies on secrecy and “tight control of 
information” (de Waal, 2002a:75). Such secretive information that reveals plans for extraction, 
perpetration and the actors involved must be made public and perpetrators must be held 
accountable (Eppel, 2013; Goredema, 2004:105; Lambourne, 2009; Mani, 2008; Scarnecchia, 
2011). Parmentier (2003, in Lambourne, 2009:12) identifies four types of truth: “forensic or factual 
truth; personal or narrative truth; social or dialogue truth; and healing or restorative truth”. These 
are all vital to understanding different violations and subsequent TJ needs for various people within 
society given endemic “serial amnesties” in the state (Bratton, 2016:220). Contrary to Chitiyo’s 
(2009:40-1) suggestion to have a truth commission that does not practice retributive justice; 
accountability and punishment for perpetration are key to validating the process (Bratton & 
Masunungure, 2018b:14-5; de Greiff & Duthie, 2009:25; Lambourne, 2009:11).  
 
In reconceptualising truth-telling, Tarusarira (2019:212-3) speaks to the need for transformative 
apologies which are both retrospective and futuristic. The author argues that focus on the moral 
and practical aspects of political apologies allows for the overlooking of the structural 
underpinnings of perpetration (Tarusarira, 2019:212). At present, the tragedy of TJ interventions 
is that they have often equated redress within the culture of impunity as “individuali[s]ed criminal 
prosecutions, rather than efforts to contest the abuse of power enabled by structural injustice” 
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(Nesiah, 2016:5). Structural redress through transformative truth-telling challenges a change of 
this with perpetrators is pivotal for the guarantees of non-recurrence in transitioning societies 
(Tarusarira, 2019:212-3). Nesiah (2016:27-8) underscores the merits of employing such structural 
engagements as useful in rethinking pre-designed blueprints of TJ interventions in making them 
more relevant to the complexities of political landscapes. Though type of truth-seeking process 
diminishes the risk of advancing single narratives of events that blanket lived experiences under 
accepted national narratives; it must be careful not to remove victim agency by allowing 
perpetrators to determine forgiveness from remorse (Goldblatt & Meintjes, 1998:28; Olckers, 
1996:62-7; Tarusarira, 2019:218-9). From this approach, institutional reform is a simultaneous 
developmental project where not only is the cycle of violence ruptured, but truth is meaningful in 
chartering avenues for justice delivery and vetting of indicted officials (Mayer-Rieckh & Duthie, 
2009:1). Political will is however needed to engage with such reforms. 
 
The second impediment lies in the “cult of violence” where the virtues of violence are 
demonstrations of manhood, dependability and bravery (de Waal, 2002a:76). Gender neutral 
stances towards TJ when navigating militarism can therefore not exist (Jelin, 2003; Olckers, 
1996:61-5; Kunz, 2014). Comprehensive approaches to peacebuilding are thus needed to facilitate 
“security, legal, political, economic, structural, cultural and psychosocial conditions” necessary to 
turn the cult of violence into one of peace (Lambourne, 2009:7). Gendered defence reform is 
important as an institutional reform tool within the military – particularly where recruitment, 
sexual violence and reproductive health training is involved (Hendricks & Hutton, 2008; 
Olonisakin et al., 2015). Likewise, given the gendered nature of this violence, particular 
masculinities are elevated. As such, even women who rise in such societies tend to “replicate 
‘masculine’ values of militarism” to survive (de Waal, 2002a:77). Narratives of power within those 
who are considered the ruling elite must therefore be reconstructed (de Waal, 2002a:77; Brown & 
Ní Aoláin, 2014:141; Kunz, 2014:605-9).  
 
As Clarke (2008) notes, past SSR and TJ efforts have largely maintained cultures of militarised 
masculinities. This needs to be reconsidered in the transitional phase as voice (as a form of 
systemic inclusion or exclusion) either thwarts or replicates denialisms where the latter further 
suppresses victim agency in the public sphere. Victim-centric justice initiatives are then inherently 
abandoned (Brown & Ní Aoláin, 2014:140-2; Hirschman, 1970). From a gendered lens, both men 
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and women need to speak of often silenced sexual violations to address root causes and heal society 
(Olckers, 1996:62-5). Failure to account for the security needs of silenced groups results in cyclical 
effects of perpetration after the transitional period. In South Africa for instance, this has resulted 
in “alarmingly high rates of sexual violence” (Hutchful, 2009:8). Silence which is an active form 
of practicing agency must conversely be respected (Brown & Ní Aoláin, 2014:147).  
 
Youth militia are another key aspect to consider when undertaking SSR in Zimbabwe. The benefits 
and employment received from the idealism of delivering the service of state sponsored violence 
by easily indoctrinated to the youth remains problematic if not adequately addressed. In militarised 
societies, they are cherished for their “physical energy, readiness to take risks, idealism, and 
courage” (de Waal, 2002a:77). The appeal for the youth to join the armed forces is also found in 
the “licenced thuggery” afforded to them when they are deployed to subvert perceived threats by 
opposition parties and civilians to government (de Waal, 2002a:78). The militia of groups such as 
the Chipangano (Kriger, 2012; Moore, 2012) remain an endemic problem in society. Chitiyo 
(2009:43) calls for the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) of such militia 
groups during the SSR process. This, coupled with Hendricks and Hutton (2009:12)’s call for 
strong governance to manage the threat of destabilisation however need to follow on from a stable 
economy were prospects for employment exist after the fact for these youths. Currently, the 
neopatrimonial state and the culture of prebendalism does not allow for this. Once a post-
authoritarian negotiated settlement is flawed, DDR and subsequent SSR strategies follow suit to 
reproduce the same result where elites retain power. This has a negative baring on prospects for 
inclusive development and socio-economic justice which remain under the control of exclusionary 
institutions which remain influenced by the military (Clarke, 2008:57-63). 
 
Proposed conditions for change 
 
Tensions exist in the literature surrounding the semantics of restructuring the security community 
in Africa. Arguments for Security Sector Transformation (SST) rather than SSR have been posited 
by scholars of militarisation from various security communities as a term, “reform” is said to be 
associated with tokenism (Ball et al., 2003:266). The argument presented is that the lack of political 
will to foster civic participation, include representation of marginalised groups within political 
settlements as well as harbour illegitimate regimes evidenced on the continent is symptomatic of 
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the of the comfort associated with the word “reform” within policy spaces (Ball et al., 2003:266). 
In this, SST is considered a contemporary approach to African security “grounded in the political, 
security and socio-economic trajectories of different African policies [by integrating challenges] 
of translating the ideal of transformation into real behavioural change on the ground” (Bryden & 
Olonisakin, 2010:4). As such, SST is complementary to delivering sustainable SSR (Bryden & 
Olonisakin, 2010:14-15).  
 
Transforming asymmetric power relations is imperative to the politics of inclusivity, alleviating 
constraints experienced by civic and TJ practitioners on the ground. Though criticisms have 
identified SSR as “a piecemeal and narrow approach to changing the security establishment” 
(Hutchful & Fayemi, 2003, in Bryden & Olonisakin, 2010:7); the semantics of “transformation” 
rather than “reform” of the security sector remain as such before the political circumstances open 
to allow change. For this reason, at this current juncture in Zimbabwe, this thesis has not dwelt on 
this part of the literature on SSR in Africa. Rather, it has treated the politics of changing the face 
of the security community as thus – albeit the semantics (Bryden & Olonisakin, 2010:3). As 
Abrahamsen (2018:24) notes, SSR’s main goal seeks “to transform militaries by subjecting them 
to democratic, civilian control and instilling respect for human rights among officers and soldiers 
alike”. Despite Bryden and Olonisakin (2010:6)’s criticism that “SSR is seen largely as an 
externally generated and driven concept [with]… near absence of local ownership of externally 
supported reform processes”; it is necessary to look toward the practicalities of contextually 
identifying possibilities for non-recurrence the Zimbabwean case.  
 
Encouraging senior military servicemen to retire is not a practicable idea in Zimbabwe at the 
current juncture. Even with the offer of immunity that Hendricks and Hutton (2009:12) propose, 
power politics and denialism of retributive justice are such that they have allowed securocrats to 
wield almost absolute power in the state without fear of consequence (Bratton, 2016; Eppel, 2013). 
Given the political situation in Zimbabwe in 2019, this thesis offers several practical 
recommendations to facilitate SSR in the country.  
 
Foremost among them is the need to address market forces that can influence Zimbabwe’s 
leadership to concede to providing social protections. Economic analysis is imperative for 
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understanding the prospects for this aspect of SSR (de Greiff & Duthie, 2009:32). Economic 
growth is imperative, not only for democratic consolidation, but for reducing the risk of eruptive 
grievances. Failure to generate growth can create instability within the security services, as a 
deteriorating economic situation, coupled with hyperinflation, can threaten regular income and 
buying power (Hendricks, 2005:121). Disgruntled military personnel in such circumstances can 
find attractive the risk of a coup, amongst other militia para-activity, that disrupts the given 
political order (Hendricks & Hutton, 2009:12; Kelsall, 2018; Karombo, 2019).  
 
Likewise, “[p]olitical settlements can break down [when] the institutions necessary for system 
reproduction collapse” (Khan, 2017: 21). Since the 2017 coup, there are indications of the fragility 
of the political settlements of ZANU-PF securocrats and their historical clients. As Beardsworth 
et al. (2019) observe: 
 
the security services also appear to be deeply internally divided, with factional divides existing within 
and between units of the police, intelligence services and military, and thus do not operate with a 
common objective in mind. In turn, this makes their behaviour hard to predict. (p. 595) 
 
Such behaviour was evident on 23 June 2018 at a ZANU-PF rally at White City Stadium in 
Bulawayo where a bomb was detonated in an apparent assassination attempt on President 
Mnangagwa from the growing “fractures” within the ruling elite (Beardsworth et al., 2019:588). 
Likewise, a repeat of the 2008 bhora musango strategy was used by dissident ruling party officials 
in 2018. Here, Webster Shamu, a former provincial minister cautioned people at a Mashonaland 
West rally “to vote for ZANU-PF at parliamentary level, but vote with their conscience in the 
presidential polls” (Beardsworth et al., 2019:588). Beardsworth, Cheeseman and Tinhu (2019:588) 
analyse this moment as “a warning to the new president not to threaten the economic and political 
privileges of the military figures who put him in power”. As the economy continues to collapse, 
there are limited resources and rents which strain historical patron-client relations. Fragmented 
politics within ZANU-PF coupled with a paralysed economy signals the collapse of the previously 
established economy of patronage and subsequent patron-client relations where there remains a 
struggle to secure ever-scarce benefits. The fluidity of political settlements which “arise and adapt 
as a consequence of crisis” must serve as a deterrent to ruling elites to alleviate the current political 
and economic crisis (Bratton, 2016:26).  




Following from this, as elite grievances increase, President Mnangagwa will need to consolidate 
power by reconfiguring loyalties within the ruling party, the state and the international community. 
At a domestic level, this may be done punishing key corrupt figures. Consolidation with civilians 
and civic organisations is unlikely without this. If he does not do so, given the size and reach of 
the ZANU-PF network, someone supported within the given elite structures will enact such 
reforms and dislodge the president given heightened factional and business strains (Alexander, 
2013:811-2; Kriger, 2012:12; Tendi, 2013:837-41). In the age of “market friendly human rights”, 
external actors who have interests in the state can act as catalysts to remedying a worsening 
economic situation by pressurising preconditions for good leadership. This is especially true when 
international actors work in solidarity with local human rights groups (Baxi, 2005, in Nesiah, 
2016:30-1; Mani, 2008:257-9). In Zimbabwe however, the practicalities of such remain difficult 
given interested states such as China which continue to lend money to Zimbabwe irrespective of 
governance and human rights abuses (Chitiyo, 2009:46; Mani, 2008:253-61).  
 
In 2019, Zimbabwe was still ruled by securocrats whose legitimacy lay in seniority within ZANU-
PF structures and through military command (Tendi, 2013:837). Luckham and Hutchful (2010) 
remind one not to be disillusioned by the liberal reform project when dealing with authoritarian 
regimes: 
 
Democratic governance of security cannot be assured if there is little democracy in the first place. Behind 
democratic façades, considerable continuity in regimes and ruling elites has often been maintained. Most 
African military and security establishments still remain in one sense or another ‘political armies’. Not only 
ex-military men but also ex-armed insurgents have reinvented themselves as democratically elected rulers… 
[they] have maintained themselves in office by manipulating elections and suppressing dissent. (p.34-35) 
 
Without this democratic façade, they have neither power nor authority which of course remains as 
an undesirable outcome for the ruling elite which would be challenged (Musarurwa et al., 
2016:143). Vetting processes could also cause ““governance vacuums” doing harm to the capacity 
of institutions—capacity that less-developed countries may not be able to do without” (Mayer-
Rieckh & Duthie, 2009:3). Equally, calls to rethink the political capital of liberation credentials as 
a trajectory to assuming political power are idealistic at best. In Zimbabwe, there would be a need 
to rethink the positions of most government officials. As such, the professionalisation of all 
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military personnel to ensure they do not play a role in governance is still a distant and idealistic 
goal for SSR (Hendricks & Hutton, 2009:12). For now, should current political cultures persist, 
the practicalities of a peacefully transitioning society with economic aspirations towards a 
developmental state, remain uncertain (Bratton, 2016:205-9; Hutton, 2010:203; Lambourne, 
































1 Section 251 stipulates the “establishment and composition” of the NPRC; Section 252 provides the “functions” 
of the NPRC; Section 253 mandates the “reports” (Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2013). 
 
2 Participants had to choose between the questions: “Those who are responsible for past political crimes should 
be granted amnesty, which means they would never be prosecuted” and “Those who are responsible for past 
political crimes should be held accountable; they should face consequences for what they have done” (Bratton 
& Masunungure, 2018b:14). 
 
3 Chimurenga is to be classified as a revolutionary struggle. The First Chimurenga also known as Umvukela or 
The Second Matabele War was from 1896-7. The Second Chimurenga also known as the Rhodesian Bush War 
was from 1966-1979. This constituted the liberation war that resulted in the independence of Zimbabwe from 
settler colonial Rhodesian rule. This war was “marked the escalation of ruthless military tactics” ranging from 
violence between ZANLA and ZIPRA guerrilla forces; intra-movement violence between ZANU and ZANLA; 
as well as between guerrillas and the Rhodesian security forces, amongst others (Bratton, 2016:50). The Third 
Chimurenga has been ongoing since 2000 is against political and economic ‘threats’ (classified as sanctions, 
civilian, anti-corruption and trade union protests amongst others) which the government claims are 
delegitimising it within the state (Tendi, 2013). 
 
4 This group of ex-ZIPRA and black Rhodesian Front (RF) dissidents were against Mugabe’s rule in the Northern 
Transvaal. ‘Super ZAPU’ was orchestrated by Rhodesian Criminal Intelligence Organisation (CIO) officers who 
had launched Operation Mute in 1982 to cause further disruption in Matabeleland and aggravate existing tensions 
in the newly formed Zimbabwean government (Meredith, 2002:64). 
 
5 Inflation rate stood at 231,000,000% at the time (Kadzere, 2008, in Thomson & Jazdowska, 2012:80). 
 
6 Rape was considered a form of genocide in Prosecutor v. Akayesu (1998) at the ICTR and a crime against 
humanity in Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo (2001) at the ICC. The latter ruling is an interpretation of the Rome 
Statute under the mandates of Articles 5, 6 and 7(g). It is also in accordance with Articles 25(e), 121 and 123 of 
the Rome Statute (UNGA, 1998). 
 
7 This faction was the ZANU-PF faction supported by Grace Mugabe and her husband in the run up to the 
ZANU-PF congress in 2017. The opposing Lacoste faction which was in support of the Emmerson Mnangagwa. 
The latter delivered the coup d’état of November 2017 which ousted President Mugabe prior to the congress 
meeting.  
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8 ‘Command Agriculture’ is a Zimbabwean industrialisation project which was initially subsidised by 
government at US$500 million. The project was due to provide inputs of “fertili[s]ers, herbicides, lime, 
diesel, pesticides, maize seed and wheat seed” to empower local farmers and revive the agricultural sector 
according to the Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency (ZIMSTAT, 2019:105). ZIMSTAT (2019:105) 
however reports that in the 2016/17 agricultural year, only “7.7 percent of households in Small Scale 
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